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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the likely impacts of export instability 
on the economic growth of the Sudan. However, before considering that, 
it was necessary to examine the factors which can lead to instability 
and the theoretical arguments linking instability with growth.
Our analysis suggested that instability in Sudan, has been high by 
international standards. In investigating the causes of this instability 
the contribution of major commodities and countries to the overall 
instability was calculated. Commodity concentration did not seem to 
be an important cause, while geographic concentration showed a marginal 
effect on instability.
The analysis also showed that most of the variability in export 
earnings was attributable to quantity fluctuations which in turn was caused 
by fluctuations in yield. On studying the impact of this export instability 
on the internal economy, it was found that it had resulted in more than 
proportional fluctuations in critical economic variables, within the 
Sudan. There was evidence that this had adversely affected the rate of 
growth of both investment and GDP.
To deal with this instability both national and international 
policies are possible. At the national level fiscal devices such as 
export taxes and counter cyclical expenditure policy seem to have 
reasonable chances of reducing instability in Sudan. Internationally, 
both bilateralism and foreign borrowing can achieve similar results. 
However, it is emphasized that the costs and benefits of such policies 
should be examined carefully before they are introduced.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The export sector in most of the less developed countries (LDCs) 
is of great importance to their development plans. The export proceeds 
provide most of the foreign exchange, needed to pay for imports, thus 
widening the selection of goods and services available to the community. 
These imports include skills, strategic goods and services, etc., that 
are unavailable domestically, but are essential in providing the basis 
for stable and relatively high rates of economic growth. The expansion 
of the export sector will hence lead indirectly to an increased supply 
of goods which should be channeled into investments in order to achieve 
an economic expansion as rapidly as possible.
To achieve growth in the export sector, the neo-classical 
prescription will call the LDCs to "specialize in the production and 
exports of those commodities in whose production "they" enjoy a 
comparative cost advantage" (Jacob Viner 1937, p. 348, cited in Soutar 
1977 p. 279).
This neoclassical prescription is based on the assumptions
that:
(1) Substitution between products (i.e. the movement along
the production frontier) can be made quickly and costlessly 
to take advantage of changes in prices as they arise.
2 .
(2) The prices and trading opportunities are known with certainty. 1
Neither of the assumptions is completely satisfied in the real 
world. With regard to the first assumption, when, an investment for 
production of a certain product is established, then it is not easy for 
it to be substituted, specially in the short run.
The second assumption also does not hold because the investment 
decision of today will be based on some probabilistic estimates of 
future prices. The presence of uncertainty with regard to prices 
modifies the neo classical prescription to be applied in terms of 
expected values of export proceeds. However'if there are variations 
from these expected values, and these variations are not costly, then 
the neo-classical prescriptions, remain valid as only expected values 
need to be considered by policy makers. Unfortunately, there seem to be 
persuasive arguments to suggest that such variations (which are often 
termed export instability) are substantial in the LDCs and that these 
variations are extremely costly" (Soutar, 1977, p. 280).
The presence of uncertainty means that countries will not 
specialise as much as expected by neo classical theory (Brainard and 
Cooper, 1968, p. 261).
It is not surprising therefore that a lot of attention has been 
focussed on the causes of export instability, their costs, and 
ways of overcoming them.
Soutar point: investment decisions which are not risk-neutral must 
deviate from the case where prices are known with certainty and eoual 
to the mean of the a priori distribution. It is not simply a matter 
of price variability about a certain mean causing change.
3 .
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to look at the export instability 
in Sudan. The remainder of this chapter will be a theoretical discussion 
of both causes and costs (impacts) of export instability. Chapter two 
will be a review of the empirical results of the studies on the subject 
to see whether the theory has been confirmed by empirical findings-
Chapter three will investigate the instability of Sudan exports, 
to find whether it is high and if so, what were the main causes of it.
Chapter four will focus on the effects of instability on the 
economy, and it's rate of growth. Finally, Chapter five will contain a 
brief summary, conclusions and policy observations.
The definition and aspects of export instability follow.
1.3 Definition of Instability
Export instability has been defined as the short term or yearly 
fluctuations of export proceeds around the growth trend of exports. Such 
instability as mentioned by some economists (Sundrum, 1967, p. 4) has 
the following three aspects.
1. Amplitude of fluctuations about the trend, i.e. the sheer magnitude 
of the divergences of actual from trend values, whether in the 
positive or negative direction.
2. Periodicity or frequency of fluctuations, i.e. the number of times a 
time-series changes direction, either in it’s original form or after
a trend factor has been removed.
4.
3. Irregularity of fluctuations, i.e. the failure of these
fluctuations to have a constant amplitude or frequency.
The instability described above, has been more severe in LDCs 
than DCs (see Chapter Two) and in general three factors have been said: 
to cause it.
1.4 Causes of Export Instability
These causal factors are:
1. The high concentration of LDCs trade in primary products
2. The commodity concentration; and
3. The geographic concentration of purchasers.
These will be discussed briefly.
1.4.1 High Concentration of Trade in Primary Products
LDCs in general draw a great portion of their export proceeds 
from primary products, or partially refined materials or minerals. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (1969), 85% of all exports 
from LDCs consisted of crude agricultural and mineral products. It is 
widely believed that the prices of these primary products fluctuate more 
violently than do the prices of manufactures. The explanation lies in the 
short run inelasticities of supply and demand, combined with the frequent 
shifts of both supply and demand schedules of these products.
1.4.1.1 Supply Instability
Agricultural commodities in general experience high short run 
supply fluctuations as a result of fluctuations in output that arise from
natural hazards of farming, e.g. pears, diseases, drought, floods, etc.
Supply can also fluctuate as an indirect result of variability 
in prices of inputs e.z\ prices of fertilizers,insecticides, herbicides, 
etc., will affect rueir amount used for production of a crop, and hence 
the supply of that crop. Technology is an important factor in shifting 
the supply curve. For example, a yield increasing innovation such as a 
higher yielding variety or an introduction of weed and pest control 
programme, will reduce the average and marginal costs causing the supply 
curve to move to the right.
Supply fluctuations of agricultural products may also arise 
because farmers regularly forecast prices incorrectly. One of the classic 
examples of this is the Cobweb effect which results in years of abundant 
supplies and low prices being followed by years of short supply and high 
prices.
1.4.1.2 Demand Instability
Demand on the other hand can fluctuate as a result of variations in 
consumers’ income (and thus their expenditure), and in the prices of other 
commodities, which are close substitutes or close complements to the 
commodity in question. Demand will fluctuate or move positively with 
variability in income and in prices of substitutes, and negatively with 
complements' prices.
Technology can also lead to shifts in demand, e.g., the demand for 
oil, gas and coal are derived demands for energy. So a change in technology 
for coal gasification, would clearly lead to a change in the demand for 
coal (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p. 50). Technology has also lead to the
5.
natural hazards of farming, e.g. pests, diseases, drought, floods, etc.
Supply can also fluctuate as an indirect result of variability in 
prices of inputs e.g. prices of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, 
etc., will affect their amount used for production of a crop, and hence 
the supply of that crop. Technology is an important factor in shifting 
the supply curve. For example, a yield increasing innovation such as a 
higher yielding variety or an introduction of weed and pest control 
programme, will reduce the average and marginal costs causing the supply 
curve to move to the right.
Supply fluctuations of agricultural products may also arise 
because farmers regularly forecast prices incorrectly.'*' One of the 
classic examples of this is the Cobweb effect which results in years of 
abundant supplies and low prices being followed by years of short supply 
and high prices.
1.4.1.2 Demand Instability
Demand on the other hand can fluctuate as a result of variations in 
consumers' income (and thus their expenditure), and in the prices of 
other commodities, which are close substitutes or close complements to 
the commodity in question. Demand will fluctuate or move positively 
with variability in income and in prices of substitutes, and negatively 
with complements' prices.
Technology can also lead to shifts in demand, e.g., the demand 
for oil, gas and coal are derived demands for energy, So a change in 
technology for coal gasification would clearly lead to a change in the deman 
for coal (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p.50). Technology has also lead to the
This is partly due to the Cobweb effect which assumes producers are 
myopic and not rational. Prices are consequently more variable. 
This is not a general conclusion, however, especially in the 
presence of inventories (Turnovsky, 1979).
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development of artificial substitutes for natural products (e.g. 
artificial fibres that compete with cotton, silk and wool) which have 
a significant depressing effect on the demand for natural products.
Other significant factors that generate demand fluctuation for 
primary products were summarized by Campbell (1973, p. 42) as:
(a) changes in the tempo of business activity (b) hot and cold wars and 
rumours of war (c) political instability and social anxiety and strikes 
(d) variations in the proportion of commodity held in store, because of 
shifts in businessmen’s expectations (e) imposition or relaxation of 
tariffs and quotas and (f) speculation in commodity markets.
1.4.1.3 Low Price Elasticity of Supply
In case of agricultural products, supply elasticity is very low or 
even zero, in the short run. This is because there is a time lag between 
market demand and a significant increase or decrease in several major 
crops, such as coffee, tea, cocoa and natural rubber. Even with annual 
crops many months are needed before a change in supply can take place.
For most metals and minerals the supply elasticity is generally higher 
than for agricultural products, but still unlikely to be substantial 
(see MacBean, 1966, p. 24).
The low supply elasticity, at least in the short run, means that 
any change in demand for a product will induce disproportionately large 
fluctuations in prices, that lead to further changes in proceeds. The 
simple diagram of Figure 1.1 illustrates this case.1
In this diagram demand shifts from to D^. In the case of the 
inelastic supply curve (Si price rises from P to P^, whereas if supply was
1 In a small span economy case the results will be somewhat different.
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FIGURE 1.1
THE EFFECTS OF A SHIFT IN DEMAND-INELASTIC VERSUS
ELASTIC SUPPLY
Price
Quantity
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elastic (Se) , price would have risen to P only. Obviously producerB
revenue increases far more in the inelastic case.
1.4.1.4 Low Price Elasticity of Demand
Primary products are observed to have low price elasticities 
of demand (Table 1.1). This means that any given shift in the supply 
curve will cause larger fluctuations in both price and producer revenue, 
than with more elastic demand curves. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2 
where it is clear that the shift from to causes far greater 
fluctuations in both price and revenue in the case of Di than for De.
TABLE 1.1
WORLD IMPORT DEMAND-PRICE ELASTICITY
Commodity Elasticity
Cocoa -0.40
Coffee -0.25
Cotton -0.35
Hemp -0.30
Jute -0.50
Manila -0.30
Rubber -0.40
Sisal -0.30
Sugar oO1
Tea -0.30
Copper -0.45
Tin i o h* o
SOURCE: Murray, J.D. & Atkinson, L.J. (1978, p.15).
9 .
FIGURE 1.2
THE EFFECTS OF A SHIFT IN SUPPLY-INELASTIC VERSUS 
ELASTIC DEMAND
Price
Quantity
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The uncontrolled shifts in supply and demand along with the low 
elasticities of both supply and demand led MacBean (1966, p. 25) to 
conclude that: "Low price elasticities combined with uncontrolled 
variability in demand and supply provide an entirely credible explanation 
for sharp instability in both prices and proceeds of primary products".
Two qualifications must be made. Firstly instability in prices and 
proceeds of primary products in general does not necessarily mean 
instability in the export revenue of the country exporting these 
products. This is because the movements in one primary product may be 
offset by opposite movements in other primary products. This may result 
in relatively stable export revenues. So if we propose that concentration 
in primary products leads to export instability, this implicitly means 
"a relatively high correlation between movements of the proceeds of 
primary products" (Soutar, 1977, p. 281).
Secondly, though the demand for primary products in the world market 
is inelastic, the demand facing the export of a single country tends to be 
elastic when it supplies only small parts of the total market for any 
of the commodities it exports, (i.e. small country). Most LDCs export 
only a small percentage of the world trade of most of the commodities. 
Exceptions are cocoa in Ghana, coffee in Brazil, jute in Bangladesh, 
and gum arabic and sesame in Sudan. This means LDCs in general are 
not in a position to affect world prices, and a change in a world 
demand of any of their exports can bring drastic changes in proceeds.
In Figure 1.3, we have an elastic world demand curve for a commodity
represented by DW^, which cuts the home supply SS at . When the
world demand shifts to DW^, the proceeds will increase by the shaded area.
11.
FIGURE 1.3
CHANGES IN A COMMODITY PROCEEDS OF SMALL 
COUNTRY RESULTING FROM A SHIFT IN THE 
WORLD DEMAND
Quantity
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1.4.2 Commodity Concentration
Commodity or product concentration was the second traditional 
cause said to give rise to export instability in LDCs. Commodity 
concentration means the export of a narrow range of products.
In LDCs there are many examples of the so called one crop 
economies e.g. Ghana "cocoa", Mauritius "sugar", Sudan ’’cotton",
Bangladesh "jute", etc. A survey by the IMF & IBRD in 1965 for 83 LDCs 
revealed that one half of the sample had 50% of their export earnings 
in one commodity. Further more, three quarters of the sample was found 
to have derived 60% of their export earnings from three or fewer 
commodities (see Table 1.2). Such a dependency on few commodities for 
export earnings was believed to cause higher export instability in LDCs.
It is sometimes argued that, if these countries were to diversify
their exports, then the export earnings would exhibit a greater degree
of stability over time. This is because changes in the proceeds of one crop
would be balanced by opposite changes in another crop, tending to smooth
out the fluctuations in the total export proceeds. The theoretical
explanation for this case depends on a theorem on sample moments. This
theorem states that if a random sample of size q is drawn from a density
2function with finite variance o , then the variance of the mean sample 
2•is g /q. In terms of export instability, if the export earnings of
individual products are independent, and could be considered random
2variables, with finite variance g , then the variance of the mean
2export earnings would be o /q. (Knudsen & Parnes, 1975, p. 23).
Under this condition, as long as q increases (i.e. the country diversifies 
its export bundle), then the variance of mean export earnings will
decrease.
13.
TABLE 1.2
COMMODITY CONCENTRATION IN THE EXPORT TRADE OF SELECTED
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1965
Country Primary Export 
Commodity
Three Commodities as 
Percentage Share of 
Total Export Earnings
Saudia Arabia Petroleum (100%) 100
Mauritius Sugar (96%) 98
Zambia Copper (92%) 94
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) Tea (63%) 93
Uganda Coffee (48%) 88
Sudan Cotton (46%) 87
Ghana Cocoa beans (66%) 85
Colombia Coffee (64%) 85
Bolivia Tin (72%) 80
Indonesia Rubber (30%) 75
Guatemala Coffee (49%) 70
Tunisia Phosphate (34%) 66
Brazil Coffee (44%) 57
Kenya Coffee (30%) 51
Mexico Cotton (19%) 33
Korea Rep. of Fish (9%) 17
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund & International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (1969, p. 153).
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This result is not applicable if the export proceeds of the 
new crop are positively correlated with those of the traditional 
exports.
Knudsen and Parnes (1975, p. 42), explained this case as 
follows: if for simplicity, we take the case of two commodities for 
export with the earnings X and Y respectively, then the variance 
of the sum of the two earnings will be
V(X+Y) = V(X)+V(Y)+2C0V(XY) 1.1
= V(X)+V(Y)+2 pxy V(X).V(Y). 1.2
where V: stands for variance 
COV: covariance
Pxy: coefficient of correlation between X and Y 
p will have the value -1 <_ p <_ 1. If P is -ve, then V(X+Y) < V(X)+V(Y). 
i.e. the variance of total export earnings is less than the sum of the 
variances in earnings of individual products, which is the point of 
diversification. On the other hand when p takes a positive value, then 
V(X+Y) > V(X)+V(Y), i.e. the total variance becomes greater than the 
sum. In this situation, at least a case can be made for diversification.
We will substitute the products that have lower correlation than the 
original product combination. An essential assumption will be the 
variances of the new commodity combination do not outweigh the reduction 
resulting from the covariance term.
Thus, stability in export proceeds will not necessarily be 
achieved.simply by exporting more goods. A country must diversify into 
exports "which have uncorrelated or (preferably) inversly correlated 
movements in world prices" (Brainard and Cooper, 1968, p. 267). This
15.
means for a rational decision on how to diversify, "it is necessary 
to examine the variances and covariances of price movements between 
various goods" (Knudsen and Parnes, 1975, p. 42).
1.4.3 Geographic Concentration
The third factor that is said to cause instability is geographic 
concentration of export markets. When an economy trades with a country 
or small number of countries, it will be susceptible to the booms and 
depressions in the economies of the importing country(ies).
MacBean (1966, p. 24) argued that most LDCs traditionally sell to 
a limited range of markets, often for historical reasons. He thought that 
regional diversification of markets would make LDCs less dependent on 
the internal fluctuations in the traditional markets.
This argument implicitly assumes statistical independence among 
the annual export proceeds that results from sales to different countries. 
If the assumption is violated and regional proceeds are positively 
correlated, then the possible gains from increased geographic 
diversification may be reduced. (See our discussion in Commodity 
Concentration)and Kingston (1976, p. 312).
In contrast to MacBean's argument, there is another view
in the literature which suggests geographic concentration reduces 
export instability. Massel (1964, p.56-67) expressed that:
16.
" On the other hand it is quite plausible that
countries whose exports are highly concentrated geographically, 
tend to have more effective methods of smoothing out the 
fluctuations in export receipts, perhaps because bilateral 
commodity arrangements may be prevalent in such areas 
... In many cases it is likely that some form of commodity 
agreement between the exporting and importing countries 
tends to reduce fluctuations in export receipts. Perhaps 
the dominant trading partner in these cases either pegs 
the price of the stable exports, or else imports a 
guaranteed amount in either case insulating the exporter 
from the full impact of market forces".
Although Massel’s argument seems to be plausible, the conditions 
of bilateral arrangements need not be fulfilled properly. In some cases 
they are only expressions of intentions. Moreover some of these agreements 
could be destabilizing factors depending upon negotiations, degree of 
fulfilment and provisions for renewing or cancelling the agreements 
(Coppock, 1966, p. 203).
1.4.4 Summary
The export of primary products, commodity concentration and 
geographic concentration have traditionally been said to destabilize 
the export earnings of LDCs. However,the last two causes are debatable 
as we saw earlier. All three factors have been tested empirically 
as causes of export instability, and diverse results were obtained 
(See Chapter Two). However, no one factor has been isolated as being 
of fundamental importance in determining instability in export earnings. 
In addition to the causes of export instability, the detrimental effects 
which instability has on growth has also received great attention in 
the literature. This will be the area to which we will now turn.
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1.5 The Effects of Export Instability on Growth
Export instability has generally been argued to create costs 
that are detrimental to growth. These costs can be divided into three 
groups:
1. There are costs resulting directly from actual movements of 
export earnings
2. There are indirect costs resulting from reactions by other sectors 
in the economy, i.e. the adjustment costs of firms and individuals
3. There are costs resulting from defensive attempts by individuals, 
firms, or the government to avoid and/or reduce these costs.
(Brainard & Cooper, p. 258).
In the first group of costs are variations in the level and 
distribution of money income to which fluctuations in export earnings 
will lead. Fluctuations in incomes are regarded by most individuals as 
an undesirable phenomenon, especially when the future magnitude and 
direction of such fluctuations are unknown and largely outside their 
control. The precise impact of export earnings instability depends on the 
structure of export production and of the labour market. If the export 
commodities are produced in mines or plantations, the fluctuations in 
export earnings fall partly on business, including foreign business, 
and partly on wages and employment. When an export commodity is produced 
by small farmers, then their income will certainly yield them less 
economic satisfaction than would stable income of the same average level. 
This is because if they do not put away some cash as reserve when their 
income rises, then they cannot support their livelihood when their 
income falls. At a low level of income, unforseen declines in income 
can even mean starvation. If these farmers borrow during poor export 
earnings, then other hardships - very high interest rates charged by
18.
money lenders in LDCs - will be placed on them (Brainard & Cooper, 1968, 
p. 259, MacBean, 1966, p. 28).
Income distribution will be affected as well by export instability.
A sudden increase in export proceeds of an important crop, will enrich 
a group of farmers. This group of farmers may increase their demand for 
home produced goods. These goods are usually agricultural products, and 
housing, which normally have low supply elasticities in the short run.
The increased demand with inelastic supply will produce sharp increases in 
domestic price levels. The increase in income realized by these farmers, 
in addition to the consequent rise in price level will make another group, 
relatively and absolutely worse off. These effects will be exaggerated 
in countries where race or tribal connections often determine occupations, 
and social tensions are already high (MacBean, 1966, p. 28).
A similar cost associated with export fluctuations is the direct 
disturbance they create in the public sector.! Xn LDCs fiscal authorities 
rely rather heavily on taxation of foreign trade. Fluctuations in export 
earnings and hence in imports are also reflected in the form of 
fluctuating revenues for the government. During trough periods in export 
earnings, either the government services must be curtailed, or other sources 
of finances should be raised. If the government increases other taxes 
to maintain its- revenues, this may lead to social and political unrest.
In seeking borrowings from abroad, then the government has to bear 
the interest costs. Further the foreign loans may not be available 
on reasonable terms. A third alternative will be deficit financing.
This route can stabilize expenditure but may make any balance of payments 
crisis worse.
This is despite some compensatory finance becoming available under 
international arrangements like LOME Convention, STABEX system and 
the IMF Compensatory Financing Facilities.
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Under the second group of costs come the reactions of each of the 
parties directly affected by a change in export earnings. Whether the 
party is an individual, a firm or the government, they are likely to 
transmit fluctuations to other parts of the monetized economy.
Variations in export producers' incomes will tend to affect their 
expenditures, on consumption and capital goods, that will affect other 
sectors' receipts. The combination of the multiplier and accelerator 
effects are therefore likely, unless offset by government policy,to 
produce fluctuations in national income (MacBean, 1966, p. 26).
LDCs in general do not have substantial reserves. Further often 
there are limitations on foreign borrowing by these countries, so 
a short fall of export earnings may require a restriction on 
both public and private imports. The restrictions on imports will delay 
the acquisition of capital goods or industrial materials needed for 
investments. Delays in getting the imported parts and equipment force 
the import-using sectors to operate at less than full capacity, thus 
creating cyclical unemployment for work force. The result will be the 
inefficiencies in investment processes, the increase in the cost of 
investment and delays in investment returns, that in the long run reduce 
the rate of return and therefore impede new investments (Brainard & 
Cooper, 1968, p. 259; Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976, p. 330).
Economic planning for LDCs is essential for their success in 
economic development. Export instability by creating the business mis­
calculations, and the difficulty of estimating the expected returns, can 
throw investment planning out of gear. Rational development planning, 
whether public or private must be able to count on the availability,
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of foreign reserves at specific future time, and not when foreign 
reserves happen to be at hand. Instability in export earnings, and 
hence external exchange and government revenue, may tend to disturb the 
continuity regarded as essential in efficient development planning 
(Lam, 1975, p. 19). This is because the rigid economic structure in many 
LDCs, will not allow them to substitute alternative projects based on 
smaller import content for current investment, when imports shrink 
suddenly.
In an uncertain climate, created by export instability, investment 
may not be allocated to more productive or higher returns activities.
This is because the violent fluctuation of export receipts may well be 
a major cause of the speculative attitude and the "get-rich-quick" 
mentality so wide spread among the businessmen in LDCs (MacBean, 1966, 
p. 108, cited from Nurkse, 1958). The private entrepreneurs will 
concentrate their business in the fields characterized by rapid turnover 
of capital. The productive activities requiring substantial fixed 
investment - which are the drive towards development - will be 
discouraged.
By creating uncertainty, export instability may tend to discourage 
the individual farmers from specializing in cash crops which yield the 
highest average returns. This is because the individual farmer producing 
for the market runs three risks: (1) the risk of a bad crop (2) the 
risk of fall in the price of his crop (3) the risk of a rise in the price 
of the food he needs to buy to support his family. The subsistence 
producer runs only the first of these risks (MacBean, 1966, p. 124).
So in some countries "mainly Asian" where cash crops are grown on land 
which can be used for food crops, the uncertainty caused by export
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instability can deter specialization and encourages subsistence 
farming.
The third type of costs, manifest themselves as follows. If the 
government or other agencies attempt to smooth out fluctuations by 
establishing buffer stock schemes, then costs will result in the form of 
storage and/or other transaction expenses. If a country aims at maintain­
ing regular imports, the export instability is likely to force that 
country to hold a higher ratio of external reserves to import, than 
would normally have been the case. Holding reserves as such is another 
cost on these countries (Stein, 1978, p. 287).
In a marked contrast to this gloomy picture of the consequences 
of export instability, another view is that it can contribute to higher 
rates of economic growth. This argument is based on the permanent 
income hypothesis. The permanent income hypotheses states that: A high 
variance in the transitory income (caused say by an export upswing) 
produces a need for large savings, thereby lowering the propensity to 
consume, and "if savings are the primary source of investment and capital 
formation in the LDCs, then a lower propensity to consume, should 
precipitate higher levels of investments" (Knudsen and Parnes, 1975, 
p. 84).
It is true that savings are necessary for investment, but it 
does not necessarily follow that a reduction in consumption will induce 
capital formation. This is because the contraction in the market caused 
by a reduction in consumption would in many LDCs effectively discourage 
investment (Stein, 1978, p. 289).
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Even if this is not so, most of the saving arising from instability 
would be kept in highly liquid securities, and would probably not be 
available for long term investments. Further, if the people behave 
according to the permanent income hypothesis, savings would be erratic 
because"almost the entire amount of any increase in income will be 
saved (but) equally any decline in current cash income will be met by 
liquidation and indebtedness"(MacBean, 1966, p. 29).
1.6 Conclusions
The literature generally argued that countries exporting primary 
products whose exports were concentrated into a few commodities or who 
relied heavily on a few markets were more likely to suffer from export 
instability than others.
As was shown that this export instability could be reflected 
in fluctuations in key macro-economic variables within an economy 
especially if a country is unwilling or unable to follow a counter 
cyclical policy. The effects of this in economic growth were debated.
The majority opinion was that instability retards growth because of 
disruptions to investment. However, there was a minority view that growth 
might be higher because of instability. The empirical support for these 
arguments provides the major focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter One some of the causes of export instability were 
discussed. Some of the theoretical arguments relating export instability 
to the rate of economic growth were then considered. Most of these 
concentrated on the harmful effect of export instability on economic 
growth though there were some theories which claimed a beneficial 
effect would exist. In this Chapter, the empirical evidence available 
in the literature will be examined in an effort to resolve this problem.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
One of the pioneering empirical studies was by Coppock (1962). He 
picked a sample of 83 countries, and developed a log variance index 
(often called Coppock Index) for measuring instability. He sought to 
explain the inter country differences in the index over the years (1946- 
1958) by a combination of single and multiple variable correlations.
He employed 37 different explanatory variables! and found that 
instability in export proceeds is most closely associated with instability 
of export quantum, prices, imports and terms of trade. With regard to 
regional concentration and instability he found a negative correlation, 
while commodity concentration showed a positive but very low correlation
1 The variables investigated by Coppock fall into one of the following 
categories: the size, growth, and importance of foreign trade; the 
direction of exports; the composition of exports; the size of the 
national economy; the economic level of the country; and prices and 
monetary factors.
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with instability. The study also showed that manufactures (as a group) 
in world trade are more unstable than primary products. Moreover the 
study showed that the mean instability index for LDCs was greater than 
that of DCs.
Michaely (1962), worked with a sample of 36 countries, for the period 
1948-58. He found a significant and positive relationship between 
commodity concentration and fluctuations in export prices, and that 
geographic concentration is positively correlated with commodity concent­
ration. It is worth mentioning that, unlike other studies which seek an 
explanation for fluctuations in export proceeds, Michaely's study 
measured the fluctuations in export prices. The two variables need not 
always move together.
Massel (1964) studied the causes in a sample of 36 countries for 
the period 1948-59- He used three variables, commodity and geographic 
concentration and the ratio of primary product exports to total exports.
He started by a simple regression of instability on commodity concentrat­
ion and the coefficient was not significant. When a geographic 
concentration index was added to the equation, it resulted in a negative 
non-significant coefficient, but commodity concentration index became 
significant. The ratio of primary product exports to total exports tended 
to be significant (though weak), when estimated with geographic 
concentration.
With the evidence of Coppock and his own results,Massel (p. 61) 
concluded that "The relationship between instability of export earnings 
and concentration of exports is a tenuous one".
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MacBean (1966) examined both causes and effects of instability.
He used Coppock's and Michaely's data and worked with a sample of 37 
countries (20 LDCs and 17 DCs) for the period 1948-58. His results showed 
that yearly fluctuations of LDCs export income is only insignificantly 
larger than for DCs. In calculating correlations between instability 
and the traditional causes that Massel used earlier, MacBean obtained 
low and non-statistically significant results. He concluded that "such 
theoretically proposed general factors as specialisation in primary products 
or commodity concentration per se, may have some slight systematic tendency 
to produce export instability, but their explanatory value in particular 
cases is very small" (MacBean, 1966, p. 36).
In investigating the effects of instability on growth, MacBean 
used cross-section data from 11 countries for the period 1950-60.
Correlation between export instability and the ratio of investment to 
income was not significant. Indeed, the results indicated that if any­
thing, a positive association appeared to exist. Correlating export 
fluctuation and the growth rate of national income, again revealed no 
significant relationship. MacBean concluded that although individual 
countries, may have had low growth rates because of export instability, 
for developing countries in general "the evidence indicates that export 
fluctuation has not been an important obstacle to their economic 
development" (MacBean, 1966, p. 127).
Maizel (1968) criticized MacBean's analysis and findings by 
pointing out weaknesses in the data, e.g. a lack of comparable and 
correctly articulated series which could seriously affect the regression 
results. Furthermore,he claimed that at times MacBean's conclusions seem 
to directly oppose his results. Maizel re-examined MacBean's data on a
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country-by-country basis rather than a cross sectional inter country 
basis, and his results supported the view that export instability and 
rate of growth of GDP were negatively related.
Since MacBean, many other studies have been undertaken all 
using cross sectional data from a number of countries, covering mainly 
the 1950's and 1960's. As far as the facts are concerned there had been 
no disagreement that LDCs are subject to more instability than DCs,
[Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969), Leith (1970), Kenen and Voivodas (1972), 
Glezakos (1973), Lawson (1974) , Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and Soutar 
(1977)]. However the exports of LDCs were more stable in the 60's than in 
the 50's [Erb and Campo (1969), Leith (1970), Naya (1973), Lawson (1974) 
and Murray(1978)].
As far as the causes are concerned, there is disagreement. Massel 
(1970), Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and Soutar (1977) found a positive 
relationship between instability and concentration of exports in a few 
commodities, whereas Naya (1973) found no relationship. Similarly 
Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and Soutar (1977) found a correlation between 
the geographical concentration of markets and instability,while Massel 
(1970),Kingston (1976) and Lam (1980) found no correlation.
The results with economic growth are even more confusing. Glezakos 
(1973) and Lim (1976) found that instability was negatively related to 
economic growth, Knenen and Voivodas (1972) found no relationship, while 
Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976) found evidence 
that instability would even have fostered growth.
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Part of the confusion about both the causes and effects of 
instability could lie in the different indexes of instability which were 
employed. Murray(1978) in fact calculated 5 of the commonly used indexes 
and found that conclusions about causes and effects depended critically on 
the index that was employed. This possibility is considered further in the 
next section. Other reasons could be the different time periods considered, 
and differences in commodity concentration and geographical direction 
of the countries that are included. These factors are also considered.
2.3 Differences in Instability Indexes
Instability as we defined in the previous chapter is taken to imply 
fluctuations around the trend. Trend identification in most of the studies 
was done by moving averages and by the least squares. The differences in 
the trend fitted can lead to different results. This is because, the 
indexes that use least squares estimate the trend for the whole period 
of the study. While those using moving averages, estimate a different 
trend each time they calculate the average.
These differences can result in a lower index when moving averages 
are used. Stein (1977, p. 280) mentionedf"The length of the chosen interval 
influences the degree of smoothing, and where it is small, the moving 
average tend to absorb some of the short term fluctuations, possibly 
causing an underestimation of instability”.
In addition to the differences between moving average techniques as 
a group, and those of least squares as another group, differences exist 
within a group according to the type of the trend chosen. For example, 
log trends whether fixed over the whole period of study, or moving assume 
annual growth rates where as linear trends assume annual growth
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increments.
The differences between the formulations of the indexes and 
their assumptions had led to different results in the studies, they were 
applied for. Massel (1964) had used two different indexes:
1. Standard error of estimate divided by the mean of the 
observations; and
2. The average annual percentage rate of change in the value of exports 
- trend corrected - (See Appendix 2.A for these indexes).
Although, Massel found a correlation coefficient of .72 between 
the two indexes, there was a large difference in country rankings 
between them. For example, Columbia was having the second highest 
instability with the first index. When the second measure was used 
its ranking dropped to 25. This tends to suggest that the indexes are not 
so closely related.
Lawson (1974) had again used two different indexes:
1. Standard deviation of the observed deviation from the exponential 
time trend.
2. The normalized standard error of deviations from an estimated 
linear time trend.
He applied the two indexes to two sets of data representing 1950-59 
and 1960-69. Discrepancies between the results of the two indexes obtained 
led Lawson to conclude that "it does make a difference which instability
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index we use".^
The different results arising from using different indexes suggest 
that the trends differ between countries. So one index which corrects for 
specific trend, may not give reliable results. Using different 
trends for different countries will not allow for inter-country 
comparisons. It follows that only those countries which have some 
similarities in their export trends should be studied together. None of 
the above studies had provided such a claim before (See Murray 1978).
2•4 The Time Periods for Which the Results were Calculated
Different studies had used different periods, and different time 
spans "intervals". Some of the studies had contained in their samples the 
post war and the Korean war years. Inclusion of these periods can 
affect the results because they were abnormal years of booms and 
depressions.
2.5 Differences in Commodity Composition and Geographic Direction 
of Exports
Different countries produce and export different varieties of 
commodities. Different commodities behave differently in international 
markets with respect to concentration and instability. Massel (1970, 
p. 27) found that "countries that derive a large percentage of their 
export earnings from food tend to experience less export instability
1 While discussing the differences between indexes, Stein (1977, p. 287) 
mentioned that Leith in his paper of "Export Concentration and 
Stability: The Case of Ghana", used four different sets of data and 
calculated the correlation coefficients between Coppockindex and one 
based on the mean percentage deviations from a linear trend. The 
figures obtained were .75, .59, .5, .75. These correlations, (especially 
the middle ones, are not very high. Leith's article was published in 
the Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. No. 1 which is difficult to 
obtain.
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than countries that are more heavily dependent on raw materials or 
manufactures".
The commodity concentration also differs a great deal between 
countries. The principal export commodity was found to count for 100% 
in Saudi Arabia and 96% in Mauritius, where its share was 19% and 9% 
in case of Mexico and Korea respectively (Table 1.2, p. 13).
The same applies for geographic concentration. Kingston,(1976) 
showed that the Hirshman index of geographic concentration for Mexico 
was 73.1 for the period 1954-67, while it was 26.8 in case of 
Pakistan for the same period. The above two points reveal the diversity 
with the samples studied.
Looking at the other part of the problem, i.e. the effects of 
export instability on the internal economies and growth, more reasons 
exist that lead to such divergent results.
There are great differences in economic structures and the degree 
of dependence of different economies on the foreign trade sector, parti­
cularly for the supplies of capital equipment. Export downswings can 
lead to bottlenecks in the availability of capital goods (where most are im­
ported in some countries and hence affect their investment programmes 
while the effect will be less where the country produce a great portion 
of the capital goods.
Lim (1974) also argued that the multiplier effects of export 
fluctuations will depend on such factors as the degree of foreign 
ownership of the export sector. It will also depend on the measures a
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country takes to counteract the effects of instability.
Given the diverse and heterogenous group of countries that are 
covered in a cross-sectional study it will follow that: "The impact 
of a given fluctuation in export earnings on the long term growth rate 
of GNP, is likely to vary substantially between different developing 
countries" (Maizels; 1968, p. 580).
From the above discussion it would seem that a more satisfactory 
approach for reaching firm conclusions with respect to both causes and 
impacts of export instability would be the study of each country 
separately (Lim, 1974).
The one country approach to the problem was adopted earlier by 
different authors:-
1. MacBean (1966) investigated the effect of export instability
on five countries, each at a time. These were Uganda, Tanganyika 
(Tanzania), Puerto Rico, Chile and Pakistan. His findings showed 
that, export instability was not harmful to the economies of the 
first three countries. The effects were moderately adverse in 
Chile and substantial in Pakistan.
2. Lim (1972, 1974) studied the problem in West Malaysia. His findings 
in the two studies showed that export instability had led . to 
economic instability. However, the unreliability of data and some 
conceptual problems prevented him from testing the relation 
between export instability and rate of growth of GDP.
3. Lam (1975) studied the impact of instability on government and 
monetary sectors in both Malaysia and Thailand. His findings
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suggested that export instability did not present as many 
serious problems as are commonly assumed, although the two countries 
are heavily dependent on trade, and their trade is heavily 
concentrated.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter had reviewed many of the empirical results of studies 
on export instability. Their findings tend to be divergent with regard 
to both causes and effects of instability.
Among all the studies only Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and Soutar 
(1977) could find a positive association between export instability 
and geographic concentration.
A positive association between commodity concentration and export 
instability was confirmed only by Massel (1970) Knudsen and Parnes 
(1975)and Soutar (1977).
The variability in primary products receipts which was believed to 
be a cause of export instability had not been confirmed by any of the 
studies.
Greater diversity of results was revealed with respect to the 
effects which instability has on growth. Coppock (1962), MacBean (1966) and 
Kenen and Voivodas (1972) obtained no consistent relationship between 
export instability and domestic instability or economic growth 
both aggregate and per capita.
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Glezakos (1973) and Lim (1976) confirmed the detrimental 
effects of instability on growth.
In a marked contrast, however,Knudsen and Parnes (1975) and 
Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976) conclude that instability may well have 
beneficial effects on economic growth.
These inconclusive results had resulted from different factors. 
Diversity of indexes used to measure instability, the heterogenous 
samples of country studied, the different time periods covered, and 
the dissimilarity between the economic structures of the countries 
had lead to such results.
To us a more convenient way to study the problem will be the one 
country approach, to which we will turn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
CAUSES OF EXPORT INSTABILITY IN THE SUDAN
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we argued that the one country approach 
can be a better and meaningful one in the study of both causes and impacts 
of export instability. In this chapter the problem of export instability 
will be studied in the context of the Sudan. The geography, economy 
and export trade pattern of the country will be reviewed in sections 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. In section 3.4 various indicators of export instability 
are considered for the Sudan. These show that Sudan's exports have been 
subject to relatively high fluctuations by international standards. In 
the final section an attempt is made to determine whether the observed 
instability is related to either commodity specialization in Sudan or to 
the geographic concentration of export markets.
3.2 Background
The Sudan is the largest geographical unit in Africa, covering an 
area of 2.5 million square kilometers. It stretches from the Egyptian 
borders at latitude 22N° to as far as 4N°. The country is bounded by 
Egypt in the north, the Red Sea and Ethiopia in the east, Kenya,Uganda 
and Zaire in the south, and Central African Repbulic, Chad and Libya 
in the west.
The country consists mainly of a gently sloping plateau with 
some elevated regions such as Jebel Marra in the west, Nuba Mountains 
in the centre, the Imatong Hills on the southern border and mountain 
ranges at the Red Sea.
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The River Nile and its tributaries, White Nile, Blue Nile, Atbara 
and the Sobat, are the most important physical features of the country. 
Almost the whole of Sudan is located within the Nile Basin.
The country displays a wide range of climatic factors from equatorial 
type in the south to a vast desert area in the north. This has determined 
the fauna and flora of the country, which has influenced the structure 
of the economy and the course of its development. Unfortunately, the 
vast unproductive desert parts lie close to the Red Sea coast, whereas 
the more productive regions are separated from the Sea by distances which 
range between 800 and 2400 kilometers. Their remoteness was a major 
obstacle towards the development of the economy until the beginning of 
the present century, when a net work of railway and steamer lines was 
developed. Still, inadequacy of transport is one of the important bottle 
necks in the economy.
The officially estimated population in 1979 was 17.3 million. The 
average density of population is low and there is no population pressure 
on the available resources at present. Open unemployment is very 
insignificant, and in fact Sudan suffers from seasonal shortages of 
labour, particularly during the cotton picking season.
3.3 The Current Economic Setting
The Sudan economy is heavily dependent on agricultural production. 
Agriculture, including livestock, forestry and fishing, contributes about 
40 per cent on average to GDP. Around 80 per cent of the economically 
active population depend for their subsistance on agriculture and related 
activities. Agriculture is the source of domestic food consumption, it
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provides inputs for a large portion of industrial activity, and 
surpluses of food and industrial crops for exports that account for over 
90 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.
The most important cash crop is cotton. Long staple cotton is 
grown in the large irrigated scheme of the Gezira, which produces
three-quarters of the total cotton production. It is also grown in 
eastern Sudan under flood irrigation. Medium and short staple cotton 
are grown usually in rain fed areas using traditional methods. Part 
of this cotton especially the American type, is consumed by the local 
textile industry, and the rest is exported.
Groundnuts recently have become the second most important earner 
of foreign exchange, due mainly to the expansion of production in irrig­
ated schemes. Traditional farmers however, also grow them under rain fed i 
conditions.
Sesame and gum arabic, tapped from Acacia Senegal, are the third and 
fourth contributor to foreign exchange earnings. Some Durra'*'Sorghum 
vulgare is also exported but most of this crop is consumed domestically 
as it is the staple food. Sudan also has a very large livestock 
population. However most animals are owned by traditional producers and 
livestock exports account for a relatively small percentage of total 
exports.
In addition to being agricultural, another feature of the Sudanese 
economy is the dominant role played by the public sector in all economic 
activities. The government is the major source of investment in the 
economy. its share in fixed gross capital formation between 1955/56-
1 Durra is the local name for Grain Sorghum.
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74/76 ranged from 51 per cent to 64 per cent. In the six year plan 
period 1977/78-1982/83 the share of the government in total proposed 
investment was 59 per cent.
In addition to investment in transport and other public 
utilities, the government also plays a dominant role in extention 
of irrigated agriculture through the construction of dams, canals, 
and the provision of assistance to mechanised pumping schemes.
The government owns and operates all public corporations whose 
contribution to the total government revenue in form of fees and charges 
exceeds 7 per cent (Suliman, 1981). In addition, the government acts as 
a partner in the production of about half of the cotton produced in the 
country, and its receipts from participation in agricultural schemes 
account for 5 per cent of its total revenues. The government has a 
monopoly control over the imports of sugar (profits from sugar monopoly 
accounts for over 16 per cent of its total revenue), and over the marketing o 
of 75 per cent of cotton overseas, as well as being the major employer of 
labour in the economy Csee Nimeri, 1970),
3.4 Pattern of Exports
Exports assume a vital role in the Sudan. This is particularly the 
case in connection with the need to generate foreign exchange earnings, 
and the financing of capital good imports. The pattern of exports outlined 
earlier is presented in Table 3.1. The dominance of cotton is obvious.
The category "others" consists largely of cotton seed, minerals and 
extractive products (chrome ore, iron and manganese). Exports from 
manufacturers are in an embryonic stage of development at this stage.
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Table 3.2 shows that the directional pattern of Sudan's exports 
has undergone significant changes during the last three decades.
Britain was the dominant customer until the late fifties, but its share 
dropped significantly during the sixties. This drop was compensated 
by new customers in the European Economic Community (EEC), mainly West 
Germany, which increased its export share from 8% to 28% and some Eastern 
European Countries, whose share increased from 0.5% to 14% by the late 
sixties.
Part of the changes in the 1970's can be attributed to the change 
in government in 1969. It called for nationalisation of the economy 
and liberation of foreign trade from the hands of capitalist countries. 
Banks? a variety of firms and companies as well as the cotton 
trade were nationalized in 1970.
This policy was followed by a fall in the purchases of Sudan's 
exports by western countries. EEC's share dropped from 33% in 1969 to 24% 
in 1971, and that of UK from 8% to 4% for the same period. The USSR, 
however, became the largest customer for that period, and its share in 
Sudan's export rose from 4.5% in 1969 to 16.1% in 1971. For political 
reasons however, USSR's imports from Sudan dropped to almost nil in 
1973. In that year the People's Republic of China took the largest share 
of Sudan's cotton followed by Japan,Italy and India. The increase in 
cotton purchases by far eastern countries, can partly be due to the 
huge expansion of textile industries in these countries.
Saudi Arabia which was a very small buyer during the sixties, 
became a major customer during the last decade. The increase in Saudi's 
income, along with the proximity of Sudan to Saudi Arabia, had resulted
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in a rise of food (mainly vegetable oil, livestock and durra) and other 
exports to that country. Further, "Saudi Arabia has become more interested 
in investing in the Sudan to develop the potential of this country as an 
important neighbouring supplier of commodities necessary to the economic 
development of the Saudi Arabian Peninsula (Lees, 1977, p.115).
3.5 Export Instability
In Chapter One, we saw that specialialization in primary products, 
geographic and commodity concentration, are said to be conducive to 
export instability. All these conditions are met in the case of Sudan.
The Sudan derives 95% of its export earnings from primary agricultural 
products. Commodity concentration manifests itself in cotton exports, 
which accounts for above 50% of export earnings. Moreover, 80% of 
export earnings are drawn from four commodities (cotton, groundnuts, 
sesame and gum arabic).
Although, significant changes took place in the directional pattern 
of Sudan exports, this was not planned. The changes were mainly a result 
of political factors. The changes in export markets in fact might have 
contributed to instability by creating shifts in demand for the export 
commodities.
The figures of Table 3.1 show that Sudan's exports have fluctuated 
over the last three decades. Between 1952-56, exports rose from 
S£41.2 millions to S£65.3 million i.e. an increase of 59%. They dropped 
by 25% in 1957, and rose again by 26% in 1962. The period 1964-66 was 
almost a stagnant one. This cycle repeated itself in later years. From 
1970-73, exports were rising, they dropped in 1974 and recovered in 1975. 
Afterwards, with the exception of the year 1978, the trend was upward.
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The argument of Chapter One was that fluctuations in exports 
could inhibit the growth of an economy. To determine whether this in 
fact happened in the Sudan requires the answer to the following questions.
1. Are the observed fluctuations in exports large by international 
standards?
2. Is there any evidence that the export instability was transmitted 
to the rest of the economy?
3. If so, is there any evidence that it had a detrimental effect 
on economic growth?
The remainder of this chapter considers the first question. It 
also tries to determine the causes of the observed instability.
3.6 Export Instability of Sudan in International Perspective
In Table 3.3 the results obtained in previous studies on the subject 
are reviewed. For each study the time period for which the instability 
index was calculated, the method by which it was measured, the mean 
value of instability indexes obtained, and the instability index of 
Sudan are reported.
The mean values for the studies of Erb and Campo (1969) Leith (1970) 
and Glezakos (1973) refer only to the LDCs in their samples. In the 
other two studies, the mean value was obtained for the whole sample of 
DCs and LDCs. Coppock and Glezakos,in addition to measuring proceeds 
instability^calculated indexes of both price and quantity instability 
as well. All the studies showed the instability indexes for Sudan exports 
to be well above the mean value. This is true for different time periods, 
with the use of different indexes for measurement, and for the three 
variables - proceeds, quantitites and prices.
TABLE 3.3
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INSTABILITY INDEXES OF SUDAN EXPORTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Study Time
Period
Method of 
Measurement
Mean Inst.Index 
for Sudan
Rank Sample
Size
Coppock (1962) (1946-58) Coppock Log Variance 
Index
26.8 40.4 78 83
" Iq " 17.1 29.8 63 83
" Ip » 15.4 25.2 59 83
Erb and Campo (1969) (1954-66) Coppock Log Variante 13.4 21.8 n.p. 45 LDCs
Leith (1970) (1957-67) Coppock Index 14.01 18.36 n.p. 70 I.DCs
.. - Linear Trend Index 6.9 9.34 n.p. 70 LDCs
Glezakos (1973) (1953-66) Arithmetic Mean 
Corrected for Trend
9.96 15.15 n.p. 50 LDCs
iq " 8.67 19.10 n.p. 50 LDCs
ip •• 7.09 9.49 n.p. 50 LDCs
Knudsen & Parens 
(1975)
(1954-67) Coppock Index 10.35 21.15 v n.p. 53
Exponential Trend 9.87 14.7 46 53
Moving Average 3.82 7.66 50 53
Iq = quantity instability index 
Ip = price instability index
* = Ranks from lowest instability (equals 1) to highest. 
n.p.= Ranks were not provided in the respective studies.
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The findings of all these studies are acceptable because 
they all measured the degree of instability around the trend, i.e. 
they had eliminated the growth trend in their calculations. The statistical 
data used in their analysis are relatively accurate, because the data on 
the foreign trade sector are easy to collect and are widely accepted to 
be the most reliable of all the data collected in LDCs (Lim, 1974, p. 80).
These findings will allow us to conclude that the degree of 
instability which Sudan experienced in its export sector is high by 
international standards. Now let us see what are the causes of such 
highly unstable export earnings. This will be the focus of the discussion 
in the following section.
3.7 Causes of Export Instability in the Sudan
Traditionally export instability was said to arise from commodity 
and geographic concentrations,and the specialization in primary products.
In this section we will look at the effects of both commodity and geographic 
concentrations on the overall instability. To do this we have to measure 
the fluctuations of each commodity (country) by means of a suitable 
instability index.
3.7.1 Instability Index
Instability was defined in Chapter One as the short term fluctuation 
around the trend. In constructing an instability index, it is necessary 
to eliminate the trend, i.e. to separate the year to year fluctuations 
(which are our concern in this study) from the long term growth trend 
over the period as a whole.
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Two problems arise in the computation of an instability
index:
1. The most appropriate and representative trend form (linear
exponential, that approximates as closely as possible the
real trend of the data for the study, should be selected because 
the type of trend fitted to the data influences the measure of 
instability obtained.
2. This selected trend should correctly and smoothly apply to the 
entire period of the study (Stein, 1979, p. 184).
The linear trend has shown a better fit from the preliminary 
graphing of the data used in the study. Therefore, an instability index 
that measures instability around a linear trend will be the approximate 
one. A widely used instability index,^ i,e, the normalized standard 
error, was chosen to measure the instability of export proceeds, quantities, 
prices and some other economic variables in this study.
This instability index is as follows:
3.1
3.2
t = time in years 
SE = standard error
100.SE
100.
n-2
n
E
t=l
(X. -
where I = Instability Index
X = Mean value of observations
= Actual values of exports
1 The index was used by Massel (1964) , Neuberger (1964), Statter 
(1964) and Lam (1975, 1980).
4 6 .
X^_ = Trend values of exports obtained by fitting a linear
least square line of the form
A
X^ = a + b^, over time, 
and n = number of observations.
This index,as it can be seen, measures the export variations 
due to instability by subtracting the variation due to growth (measured 
by the regression line) from total variations of the actual export 
earnings. As a way of making indexes comparable over all commodities 
(or countries), these variations are divided by the mean observation i.e. 
they are standardized.
The above index will be used to measure the degree of export 
fluctuations in the Sudan for the period 1956-80. 1956 is the year in which 
Sudan got her independence and became an independent financial unit. 
Moreover, we need to eliminate the early fifties, because of the boom in the 
world market associated with the Korean war.
However, the period was broken into two subperiods because of data 
limitations. Data have been taken from two sources, viz, 1 The United 
Nations International Trade Statistics for the first period 1956-68 and,
2, the Bank of Sudan annual report statistics for the second period 1969-80. 
Some differences exist between the two sources in the overlapping years 
that does not encourage us to pool the whole series together. We could 
not carry on with the UN Statistics because some commodities had been 
aggregated together, in the post 1970 records of the UN. Moreover, data 
on production and area cultivated (that is used in decomposition of quantity 
variation into yield and acreage components) was available for the second 
period only. This compells us to treat it as a separate period.
The instability index for the first period is 12.42 and for the second 
is 9.83 (see Table 3.4). This result suggests that there has been a 
reduction in export instability over time in the Sudan. It is a similar 
result to those obtained by Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969), Leith (1970),
Kenen and Voivodas (1972), Naya (1973) and Lawson (1974), where all found 
a decline in the export instability in LDCs over time.
In Table 3.4 there are three columns for each period. Column one, 
measures the instability index of each commodity, and the second represents 
its share in the overall exports. The third represents the instability 
share. This indicates the share of total instability attributable to a 
specific commodity.
The contribution of each commodity to the instability of total 
exports depends on:
1. The degree of instability of the commodity; and
2. The share of that commodity in the total export earnings.
The commodity may be very unstable, but if it is a relatively minor export 
item, then its contribution to the instability of total exports will 
be relatively small, and vice versa. So the instability share in Table 
3.4 is in fact a weighted instability index, calculated by multiplying 
the figures in columns 1 and 2, then dividing this product by the sum of 
all products. Mathematically, the share of the ith commodity (Si), to the 
instability of the total exports is given by:
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where I. = The instability index of the ith commodity
n = Number of commodities, and
M_^  = The sum of the earnings from ith commodity over the
period under analysis.
1
Such a procedure, which has been used extensively, appears to 
assign precisely each export item's own responsibility for total export 
instability (Stein, 1979).^
3.7.2 Commodity Concentration
A number of conclusions can be drawn from Table 3.4. Firstly, 
fluctuations in the export earnings of each commodity and for the two 
periods, are above that of total export earnings. This suggests that the 
random movements in various commodity receipts were offsetting,leading to 
some stabilizing impact in total earnings.
The second major conclusion is that commodity concentration does 
not seem, to have been the major cause of instability. Well over 75% of 
export earnings were produced by the four major export crops (namely 
cotton, groundnuts, Gum Arabic and sesame), but the instability share 
of these crops taken as a group was only 64% in the second period for 
example. Of these crops, only groundnuts showed an instability share 
above the export share. On the other hand, the minor crops durra and 
livestock contributed more to instability than their export shares.
 ^ See Coppock (1962), Lam (1975), Stein (1979) and Lim (1981).
For details on the advantages of the use of this type of instability 
index, see Stein (1979). The Log trend based index would be more 
stable because it deals with proportions and proportional changes.
2
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TABLE 3.4
INSTABILITY INDEXES AND THE WEIGHTED CONTRIBUTION TO INSTABILITY 
OF SUDAN MAJOR EXPORT COMMODITIES (1956-80)
Period
1
(1956-68)
2 3 1
(1969-80)
2 3
Commodity Instability 
Index of 
Exports
% of Export 
Share
Instability
Share
Instability 
Index of 
Exports
% of Export 
Share
Instability
Share
Cotton 22.20 55 54 23.24 53 36
Ground Nuts 27.15 9 11 68.89 10 20
Sesame 14.64 7 5 23.21 8 5
Gum Arabic 13.83 10 6 13.96 7 3
Cakes and Meals 19.12 4 3 35.8 4 4
Durra 61.45 2 6 144.8 4 16
Livestocks 29.95 2 3 74.14 3 7
Hides and Skins 13.97 2 1 31.71 2 2
Others 27.82 9 11 22.97 9 7
Total: 12.42 100 100 9.83 100 100
SOURCE: Table 3.1.
INSTABILITY
TABLE 3.5 
INDEXES OF PROCEEDS QUANTITY AND UNIT VALUE OF
SUDAN MAJOR EXPORT COMMODITIES 1956-1980
Period Instability Indexes 1956i-68 Instability Indexes 1969-80
Commodity Proceed Quantity Unit Value Proceed Quantity Unit Value
Cotton 22.20 23.69 12.10 23.24 27.58 13.98
Ground Nuts 27.15 27.65 9.12 68.89 63.94 16.82
Sesame 14.64 20.98 15.81 23.21 25.76 24.96
Gum Arabic 13.83 9.65 7.36 13.96 32.55 34.55
Cakes and Meals 19.12 15.44 10.14 35.80 25.79 23.87
Durra 61.45 71.83 ‘17.68 144.80 90.33 41.29
Livestocks 29.95 32.17 19.10 74.14 45.55 29.05
Hides 6 Skins 13.97 17.45 13.07 31.71 25.66 32.87
Others 27.82 - - 22.97 - -
Total: 12.42 - - 9.83 - -
SOURCE: Appendix 3.A and 3.B.
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3.7.3 Price Versus Quantity Instability
From a policy viewpoint, it would be useful to determine whether 
observed fluctuations in export earnings were caused more by price or 
quantity fluctuations. Figures for each crop are provided in Table 3.5.
These figures show that quantity instability has generally been 
larger than price instability, with the recent exceptions of gum arabic 
and hides and skins. These figures imply that the proceed variations have 
been due more to quantity than price instability. However, a more 
rigorous method must be employed in order to confirm this conclusion.
Gross export income (GI) of a commodity is a product of price (P)
and quantity (Q). When P and Q are correlated the variance in (GI) can
be allocated between P and Q in the following fashion.
Var [PQ] = E2 [P] Var [Q] + E2 IQ] Var [P] + 2E [Q] E [P] Cov IPQ]
? 2 2-Cov [P,Q] + E [ (P-E [PZ) (Q-E(Qz) ]
+ 2E[P] E [(Z-E(Q))2 (P-EIPZ)]
+ 2E[Z] E [(P-E(P))2 (Q-EIQJ)J 3.4
Burt and Finely (1968, p. 737), suggested that by ommiting higher 
order interactions, this variance is approximated as follows:
GI = P.Q. 3.5
Var (GI)/— J A + B + C 3.6
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where A = (Q) var (P)
B = E2 (P) var (Q)
C = 2E (Q) . #P) Cov (P Q)
and var = variance
cov = covariance 
ft = mean
9ft = mean square
The value A is taken as the direct effect of variability in price.
B is the effect attributable to quantity and C is the first order inter­
action (based on the covariance between P and Q), that cannot be decomposed 
into separate effects. Burt and Finely claimed that the term of linear 
interaction, C, will dominate the higher order-terms and should approximate 
the full interaction between price and quantity. Higher order-terms in 
the exact var (GI) can be omitted. To make the interpretation 
easy, they suggest that, the three terms A, B, and C in Equation 3.6
above, should be expressed relative to (A+B). The positive direct price
A Band quantity effects, i.e. (-----) and (-■ --) respectively, sum to one.A+B A+B
cThe third term of interaction (ttvt) will take either sign.A+B
Houck (1973) applied this method to detrended data for Australian 
wool, wheat and beef for the period (1946-1970). He obtained satisfactory 
results for both wool and wheat. His results for beef showed that the 
interaction term was relatively higher than the direct effects. Being a 
negative term and at the same time large, Houck could not apportion the 
interaction term between price and quantity.
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Goldberger (1970) criticised Burt and Finely's procedure and 
pointed out that, for some values, the method may not be accurate and 
will involve a high percentage of error. In their reply to Goldberger's 
criticism, Burt and Finely (1970) pointed out that the higher order 
interactions can easily be ignored in detrended data, because their value 
will be very small.
Piggott(1978) mentioned three other criticisms of Burt and Finely's 
paper. These criticisms are:
1. Piggottquestioned whether there is any necessity for the 
approximation formula (i.e. equation 3.6) because the interaction 
effect can be computed as the difference between the true value 
of the variance of GI and the sum of the first two RHS terms
(in equation 3.4).
2. He asked how the first RHS term can be called a. direct effect 
of price, though it contains the square of the mean quantity?
The same applies for the second RHS term.
3. Thirdly,he mentioned the difficulty in interpreting the results 
when the interaction term is relatively large, as it was the case 
for beef in Houck's study.
As an alternative procedure,Piggott suggested the study of the 
historical pattern of supply and demand variability, underlying a particular 
pattern of revenue instability, to place the analysis on an analytical 
framework. This requires the estimation of supply and demand functions.
These estimations could not be made for Sudan with the data at hand.
For example, the series on prices are those by which commodities were sold 
abroald, and these would not be the prevailing farm gate prices at sowing time.
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TABLE 3.6
SEPARATION OF GROSS INCOME VARIATION'S FOR SUDAN EXPORTS INTO PRICE AND QUANTITY 
COMPONENTS (1956-1980) WITH THE LINEAR INTERACTION (COVARIANCE TERM)
SHOWN SEPARATELY AND APPORTIONED EQUALLY
1956-68 1969-80
Item Income Variation attributable to: Income Variation attributable to:
Price Quantity Linear Price Quantity Linear
A/(A+B) B/(A+B) Interaction A/(A+B) B/(A+B) Interactioi
C/(A+B) C/ (A+B)
Percent Percent
Cotton 18 82 -44 19 81 -53
n . p . n . p .
Groundnuts 9 91 -8 8 92 -36
Sesame 36
5
64
95
4 46
n . p .
54 -23
37 63 45 55
Gum Arabic 38 62 16 55 45 -67
40 60 65 35
Cakes & Meals 35 65 10 46 54 1
36 .64 47 53
Durra 7 93 -34 31 69 75
Livestocks 29 71 n . p . -23 30
39 61
70 78
23 77 39 61
Hides & Skins 31 69 -30 63 37 -44
.23 77 73 27
NOTES:
1. The covariance term was shown separately and was equally apportioned between 
price and quantity (italic figures) as was suggested by Gclderberger (1970).
2. The figures wirtten in italic is the results after apportion
(A+C/2) . (B+C/2)
A = -------  , B = -------.
(A+B+C) (A+B+C)
3. n.p. means apportion is not possible because the covariance term is negative
and relatively high.
SOURCE: The figures were obtained from detrended data of Appendices 3.A and 3.B.
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The supply function therefore could not be estimated.
In this study we will use the Burt and Finely*s procedure that 
will give us understandable results for our purpose (i.e. how much of 
proceeds variability is attributable to price and quantity).
In Table 3.6 the values of A, B, and C were calculated, as 
indicated in equation 3.6 from trend corrected data. Further computations 
were made to separate the output variation into acreage and yield 
components. Because of data limitations the acreage-yield analysis could 
be done for the second period (1969-80) and for cotton, groundnuts, 
sesame and durra only. The results are presented in Table 3.7
Table 3.8 brings the results of Tables 3.6 and 3.7 together. Yield 
and acreage percentage figures were multiplied by those of the quantity 
to obtain the percentage contribution of acreage and yield to the 
total proceed variations (See Houck, 1973).
Major results show that most of the proceeds variations are due 
to quantity component, with the exception of price effects of gum arabic 
and hides and skins in the second period. Most of the quantity variation, 
arose from yield variation for the crops studied. Many reasons why this 
occurred can be suggested for each crop but this is beyond the scope 
of this study. It would however, be crucial for consideration of policy, 
e.g. if the next chapter reveals that export instability caused problems, 
then causes of instability of each crop presented in the table should 
be examined in far more detail before policy recommendations could be made. 
This is mentioned again in the final chapter.
TABLE 3.7
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SEPARATION OF OUTPUT VARIATION FOR FOUR COMMODITIES INTO ACREAGE 
AND YIELD COMPONENTS (1969-1980)
Item Output Variations attributable to:
Acreage Yield/Feddan Linear Interact ion
Cotton 21 79 53
31 69
Groundnuts 25 75 -12
22 78
Sesame 31 69 11
33 67- ■
Durra 27 73 1
NOTES:
The figures in italics are obtained from partition of covariance term equally between yield
and acreage, see Table 3.6.
SOURCE: Obtained from detrended data of Appendix 3.C.
SEPARATION OF
TABLE 3.6
PROCEEDS VARIATION FOR FOUR COMMODITIES INTO PRICE,
ACREAGE, AND YIELD COMPONENTS (1969-1980)
Item Proceeds Variations attributable to:
Price Acreage Yield/F eddan
Per Cent
Cotton 19 17 64
Groundnuts 8 23 69
Sesame 46 17 37
Dur ra 31 19 50
SOURCE: Tables 3.6 & 3.7.
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3.7.4 Geographie Concentration
It was shown above that the instability of export proceeds
was due mainly to instability in quantities sold. However instability 
was not directly attributable to the concentration of exports on few 
commodities. In this section the relation between instability and 
concentration on a few buyers is considered.
Table 3.9 gives figures on the instability indexes, export share, 
and instability share of Sudan’s major customers. The instability index 
was calculated using the normalized standard error index (equation 3.2). 
The instability share, i.e. the weighted contribution of each customer 
to the overall instability was obtained by the use of equation 3.3.
The indexes and contributions were computed for the two periods 
mentioned earlier.
From the table, the instability indexes of each country for the 
two periods, are higher than the indexes of the total exports. This, again 
means that the movement in Sudan’s foreign markets were offsetting.
Let us take the five main customers in the first period (i.e. 
Germany, India, Italy, Egypt and the U.K.). Their export share was 
51.69% and their instability share was slightly above this percentage 
at 52.07%.
For the second period, the five main customers (China, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and Saudi Arabia), had an export share of 43.81% and an 
instability share of 46.98%. The instability share is again above (though 
small) the export share.
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In view of the above results, it seems that the geographic 
concentration on some major customers (Egypt, India and the UK for 
the first period, and Saudi Arabia and China for the second period) 
had contributed marginally to export instability.
3.8 Conclusion
Investigations in this chapter suggest that the instability of
Sudan's exports is high by international standards. However, it appears to 
have been falling over time.
In analysing the causes of such instability for the period (1956- 
1980), the nonavailability of a complete series of data compelled us to 
split the period of study into two subperiods. To find the contribution 
of different commodities and countries to the overall instability, a widely 
used method that assigns the share of total instability to specific 
commodity and/or country was employed.
The results showed that major export items, with the exception of 
groundnuts , had added less to the total instability than their export 
share. This in turn implies that commodity concentration was not a major 
cause of instability.
Some of the major customers had slightly greater instability shares 
than their export shares, meaning that geographic concentration may have 
contributed to total instability. However; this contribution was 
marginal.
When the export proceeds of each commodity were broken by price 
and quantity, three groups of commodities could be distinguished:
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1. Group (A): Where above two thirds of proceeds variation
was attributable to quantity. This group included 
cotton, groundnuts, durra and livestock for the 
two periods.
2. Group (B): Where the portion attributable to quantity was slightly
greater than that of price. This group included sesame 
and cakes and meals for the two periods, and the gum 
and hides and skins in the first period.
3. Group (C): Where variation due to price was greater than the
variation due to quantity. This group was represented 
by gum and hides and skins in the second period only.
The decomposition of quantity variation into yield and acreage showed 
that most of the variation was associated with yield variation for the 
crops studied.
Whether this instability had been transmitted from export sector 
to the rest of the economy, and how it affects the rate of economic 
growth, will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPORT INSTABILITY 
IN SUDAN
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that export instability in 
Sudan has been high by international standards. In this chapter the 
effects of this instability on the domestic economy are considered.
A fairly large body of literature exists which relates instability in 
national income to export instability. This literature is reviewed 
briefly in section 4.2. The effects of export instability on national 
income, government sector and imports in Sudan, will be considered in 
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 will focus on the impacts of export instability 
on the rate of growth of both investment and GDP.
4.2 Export Instability and Economic Instability
The term economic instability is commonly used to mean the 
instability in national income. Exports fluctuations can cause fluctuations 
in the internal economy by affecting the income of the producers in the 
export sector directly. This will in turn affect their domestic consumption 
and investment expenditures. These variations in consumption and investment 
will cause similar fluctuations in the incomes of domestic goods producers, 
which in turn causes additional variations in the domestic consumption 
and investment. Through this form of multiplier, the fluctuations in the 
export earnings will produce changes in national income which are in
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the same direction, and which in the absence of government intervention 
will be more than proportional to the initial changes in the export 
proceeds (MacBean, 1966, p. 26).
Export fluctuations can lead to similar fluctuations in the money 
supply of an economy. The increased foreign earnings during an export boom 
will increase foreign reserves and deposits, and can lead to secondary 
credit expansion and an increase in money supply. On the other hand, 
reserves may be reduced in an export down turn. This will reduce bank 
deposits and liquid assets and will provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for credit contraction (Lam, 1975, p. 16).
Export instability can also seriously affect government revenue 
in developing countries. Many LDCs rely heavily on tariffs and various 
forms of taxes on traded goods as sources of revenue. If imports are 
financed through export revenue, variations in exports will produce 
similar variations in imports, which will be reflected in changes in 
government revenue.
Government expenditure need not follow similar patterns if the 
government adopts countercyclical budgetary policies. However, to do this 
it would have to have an effective machinery to stabilize demand. This, 
MacBean (1966, p. 27) argues, is not present in most LDCs. Moreover, it 
is politically difficult for governments in LDCs to restrain expenditure 
during boom periods. These factors mean that most governments in LDCs are 
forced to follow procyclical expenditure policies (Yotopoulus and Nugent
1976, p. 329) .
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These factors imply that national income will fluctuate 
in sympathy with export fluctuations. This does not necessarily imply? 
however, that export instability will reduce the long term growth rate 
of national income. The argument, as outlined in Chapter One,is that 
investment is lower in conditions of instability than it would otherwise 
be. This is due partly to the possibility of making losses in poor years, 
and partly to the unpredictable imports of crucial capital goods.
Whether this has occured in the Sudan is the topic of the next 
sections.
4.3 Sudan’s Domestic Instability
In this section the link between export instability and fluctuations 
in national income in Sudan are considered. The foreign trade multiplier 
for Sudan is also calculated so that the size of the effect of export 
instability can be assessed.
The aggregate expenditure in an economy has two main components: 
the expenditure that is injected into the system and the expenditure 
that arises from within it because of the spending of domestic households. 
Total expenditure in the economy is thus, total injections (exports, 
government expenditure and investment expenditure) plus household 
expenditure on domestically produced goods and services.^ This means 
a rise in exports, government expenditure, or investment expenditure, 
ceteris paribus, will raise the level of national income (Lipsey, 1972, 
p. 456-471).
1 This means the total expenditure E = C+G+I+X. But consumption
expenditure is commonly defined as all expenditure on goods and services 
whether produced at home or imported, i.e. total consumption C* = C+M 
Imports are withdrawals from the income flow, this means 
E-M = C+G+I+X-M
Rearranging E = (C+M)+G+I+(X-M)
E = C*+G+I+(X-M)
which is the formula often used. (See Lipsey, 1972, p. 457).
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In the Sudan, exports contribute more to national income than 
either government expenditure or gross domestic investment spending.
The figures for the period 1956-78 were £ 2 5 6 7  million, jfS 2554 million 
and 2385 million, respectively. This suggests that variations in 
exports are likely to be powerful generators of fluctuations in national 
income. Added to this is the fact that one export commodity, that is 
cotton, generates around 20 per cent of the money income in the economy 
(Nimeri, 1970).
The export taxes in the country are low (3-5 per cent ad valorem),
this renders them to be ineffective in ironing out export fluctuations.
For them to cushion the economy from export fluctuation, they need
2to be high and progressive.
The fluctuations in exports can easily be felt as fluctuations 
in national income because of the ineffective fiscal and monetary 
devices of the country that can counteract them, as we will see in 
the next chapter.
4.3.1 Export Instability and National Income Instability 
GNP is used to measure fluctuations in national income rather than 
GDP. GDP includes the export profits repatriated abroad. If export 
instability is reflected largely in fluctuations in profits which are 
expatriated, while local operating costs are relatively steady, Lim 
(1974, p.82) argues that GDP will exaggerate the degree of domestic 
instability.
The absolute and percentage deviations in GNP and exports from a 
linear and a logarithmic trend are given in Table 4.1. Because of data
* £S = Sudanese Pound.
Such taxes result in more equitable sharing of costs of fluctuations 
between Public and Private sectors. However, the problem of incentives 
remains.
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TABLE 4.1
SUDAN'S CUP AND EXPORTS. AND THEIR DEVIATIONS FROM TREND 
IN CURRENT PRICES 1956-78C*3)
t ^
DEVIATIONS FROM:
1
t PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM:
^Linear Trend : Loftrithmic Trend Linear Trend * Logrithmic Trend
Yaar GNP Export* ; GNP Export* GNP Export* GNP Export* j GNP Exports
1956 299.3 59.7 402.5 28.1 70.2 8.4 134.48 47.07 23.45 14.07
1957 299.3 60.5 318.7 21.6 48.1 5.5 106.48 35.70 16.07 9.09
1958 329.0 64.6 264.5 18.5 53.6 5.7 80.40 28.64 16.29 8.82
1959 338.1 63.7 189.8 10.3 36.1 0.6 56.14 16.17 10.68 .94
1960 339.2 65.6 107.1 4.9 8.1 -2.0 31.57 7.47 2.39 -3.05
1961 385.0 65.6 69.0 -2.4 21.9 -6.8 17.92 -3.66 5.69 -10.37
1962 415.7 65.1 15.7 -10.1 17.6 -13.5 3.78 -15.51 4.23 -19.20
1963 450.0 77.7 -33.6 -4.1 13.5 -?-5 -7.47 -16.18 3.00 -7.08
1964 459.6 90.3 -107.8 0.5 19.0 1.2 -23.46 .50 -4.13 1.33
1965 471.5 86.3 -179.7 -10.7 53.3 -9.2 -38.11 -12.40 -11.30 -10.66
1966 492.0 82.3 -243.1 -22.0 83.4 -20.0 -49.1 -26.73 -16.95 -24.30
1967 503.5 89.0 -315.4 -22.6 127.5 -20.6 -62.64 -25.39 -25.32 -23.15
1968 541.1 93.4 -361.7 -25.4 150.7 -24.1 -66.85 -27.19 -27.85 -25.80
1969 589.3 103.4 -397.3 -22.7 169.3 -22.5 -67.42 -21.95 -28.73 -21.76
1970 697.1 113.2 -373.3 -20.2 134.7 -21.7 -53.55 -17.85 -19.32 -19.17
1971 757.9 123.4 -396.4 -17.3 154.1 -21.1 -52.30 -14.02 -20.33 -17.10
1972 828.7 120.9 -409.4 -27.0 171.3 -37.0 -49.40 -22.3 -20.67 -28.12
1973 888.5 151.3 -433.4 -3.9 208.0 -14.7 -48.78 -2.58 -23.41 -9.72
1974 1236.4 167.1 -169.3 4.6 43.1 -10.7 -13.69 2.75 2.76 -6.40
1975 1495.1 169.4 5.5 -0.3 176.8 -21.1 .37 .20 11.83 -12.46
1976 1827.9 206.4 254.5 29.4 382.5 2.2 13.92 14.24 20.93 1.07
1977 2322.9 230.1 665.7 45.8 738.0 11.3 28.66 19.90 33.71 4.91
1978 2868.3 218.2 1127.2 26.7 1130.5 -16.2 39.30 12.23 39.91 -7.42
Instability Indax 48.68 18.99
Coafflclant of variation 84X 48X
NOTES: Coefficient of variation la tha atandard daviation dlvldad by the mean. 
SOURCE: IKF - Financial Statlatlca - National Account* - 1982.
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limitations and the non-availability of real values, current ones 
were used.
Table 4.2 summarises the figures in Table 4.1. The percentage 
trend deviations of GNP is represented by (AY) and of exports by (AX).
As Table 4.2 shows AY and AX moved in the same direction for greater 
parts of the observations. The sympathetic movements were stronger when 
the linear trend was used, where 78 per cent of the observations moved 
in the same direction. With the logarithmic trend 65% of the observations 
moved in the same direction.
TABLE 4.2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS OF GNP FROM TREND 
(AY) AND PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS OF EXPORT EARNINGS FROM TREND 
(AX) IN CURRENT PRICES (1956-78)
Equation
No. of times when AY 
and AX moved in same 
direction
Simple Regression Analysis 
AY = a + b AX
2a b R
Linear 18/23 = 78% .39 2.58
t(12.41)
0000
Logarithmic 15/23 = 65% 10.93 1.26
t(5.37)
.58
NOTES:
t values were calculated as follows 
t = r n-2
1-r
Both values are highly significant.
6 6 .
To determine whether GNP deviations and export deviations were 
correlated, we followed the conventional approach (MacBean, 1966, Lim,
1974, Stein, 1979) and regressed the percentage trend deviations 
of the former on that of the latter. The results are presented in 
the third column of Table 4.2. A statistically positive association 
between the two variables exists, showing that GNP fluctuations and 
export fluctuations were closely related. The correlation coefficients 
(r) were .93, and .76 for the linear and logarithmic trend respectively.
These resutls showed that the direction of changes of export earnings 
and GNP were consistent. The next question will be whether the impact of 
export instability on GNP has been aggravated or dampened? To answer the 
question, we will calculate the foreign trade multiplier.
We would predict that the foreign trade multiplier is greater than 
one. This is because the coefficient of variation of GNP was 84% and that 
of exports was 48%.Further the instability index of the former was 48.68%, 
and for the latter was 18.99. Given the consistency of movements between 
the two variables, this suggests that the impact of export instability 
on GNP had been aggravated. Estimated values of ’b 1 in Table 4.2 also 
indicate this.
4.3.2 Foreign Trade Multiplier
To calculate the foreign trade multiplier accurately is a long and 
involved process. Consider the formula for gross national product (GNP):
Y = C + I + G + X -  M -  T (4.2)
where Y = Gross national product at market prices (or 
national expenditure)
C = Consumers’ expenditure
I
G
Gross capital formation at home
Public authorities’ current expenditure on goods and services
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X, M, = Exports and imports respectively 
T = The amount of indirect taxes payable at current
rates on the goods and services.
With simple Keynesian consumption, import and tax functions, we can 
derive a foreign trade multiplier as:
( 1S+m+t 4.3
where m = marginal propensity to import
S = marginal propensity to save.
t = the proportion of increase in domestic income which accrue 
to the government.
Equation 4.3 was the foreign trade multiplier suggested by MacBean 
(1966, p. 92). However, he adjusted it to allow for the leakages from 
the system, specifically repatriated profits from export earnings re­
exports and export taxes. He therefore calculated the multiplier as:
(1 - Px mx - V
(m + Sy y + t )y
4.4
where:
P^ = the proportion of export proceeds repatriated to 
foreigners,
m^ = the proportion of export proceeds which are re-exported 
in natural or processed form,
t^ = is the proportion of export proceeds which accrues
to the government through taxes on exports and on exporters 
income, and
Y, X, ny, Sy, ty = are as Y, X, m, s and t respectively.
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If MacBean’s formulation is applied to Sudan the foreign trade 
multiplier for the period 1956-78 is 2.09. The figures on which this is 
based are found in Table 4.3, and a detailed explanation of the calculations 
are in Appendix 4.B. This suggests that fluctuations in exports would cause 
more than proportional fluctuations in national income.
TABLE 4.3
VALUES OF THE PARAMETERS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE MULTIPLIER 
OF SUDAN 1956-78
Px
Mx
tX
my
sy
t
y
o.oi
0.04
0.05
0.14
0.17
0.12
NOTES:
These figures were calculated in a rough manner. They illustrate rather 
than determine the extent to which export fluctuations were exaggerated in 
the national economy.
SOURCE: Appendices 4.B and 4.C.
There are, however, many problems with MacBean’s method. For example, 
he did not include an investment function, and assumed government expenditure 
was exogenous. If a simple one period investment function is included,
I = e + f Y 4.5
Still assuming G and X are exogenous, then the multiplier would be
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AY AX S+ M - f+t 4.6
(see Appendix 4.A.1)
where f is the marginal propensity to invest.
Adapting for leakages in the manner of MacBean, equation 4.6 becomes:
AY = AX (1 - PY - My - tY) , ,
Sy + My - Py + ty
as a more realistic foreign exchange multiplier. Clearly there is no 
need to estimate this multiplier, as it would produce a greater figure 
than that using the MacBean's formula. The conclusion therefore would 
be the same.
Even this specification is not very realistic as very simple 
consumption and investment functions were assumed. To calculate the 
foreign multiplier accurately would require the econometric estimation of 
an investment function which incorporated lags and a more realistic 
consumption function as a minimum. It is not possible to do this with 
the available data, but there is no reason to suppose that the new 
foreign trade multiplier would be less than unity. Even more evidence 
is found by calculating the elasticity of GNP with respect to exports.
The estimated equation
Log GNP = -1.68 + 1.50 Log exports. 4.8
reveals that the elasticity was 1.50. These results imply that a 
given percentage change in exports would cause an even greater percentage 
change in national income.
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The conclusion of this section therefore is that export instability 
has been transmitted to the internal economy of the Sudan. However before 
we examine the effects of export instability on the economy's rate of 
growth, we would like to see how other economic variables had reacted 
to export fluctuations.
4.3.3 Export Instability and the Government Sector 
The government sector is particularly important in determining 
national income in Sudan. This is because both government recurrent 
expenditure and investment are relatively high compared to private 
expenditure and investment.
On the other hand, the government relies heavily on the traded sector 
for its revenue. This is from commodity taxation and from the government's 
direct involvement in the production and export of cotton. Fluctuations 
in exports therefore will cause government revenue to fluctuate, which 
will be reflected in national income fluctuations unless the government 
uses its expenditure policy as stabilization measures. This section will 
consider the following questions:
1. How important is the export sector to government revenue?
2. Has government revenue fluctuated with export fluctuations?
3. Has the government's expenditure policy been used as a 
stabilization device?
Details of government revenue are provided in Table 4.4. Fluctuations 
in export earnings will result in fluctuations in domestic incomes and 
income tax, property tax and non tax revenue (other receipts) will be 
affected. Fluctuations in domestic income will affect the demand for
Year
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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TABLE 4.4
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES. SHOWN BY SUB CATEGORIES FOR THE PERIOD 1956- 78
Cfs 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 )
Income
Tax
Import
Duties
Export
Duties
Other Indirect 
Tax and Sugar 
Monopoly
Income from 
Property
Other
Receipts
Total Govi 
Revenue
2.09 7.77 4.89 6.19 5.77 7.49 34.2
2.03 7.35 5.30 6.65 6.48 7.63 35.44
1.39 8.90 9.40 4.70 10.10 8.45 42.94
1.93 13.09 6.00 6.64 1.86 12.46 41.98
1.88 20.14 9.23 10.21 7.88 18.13 67.47
1.59 19.54 8.95 9.91 7.98 16.10 64.07
1.76 17.80 4.27 10.7 6.47 16.02 57.02
2.22 27.79 4.66 6.05 6.85 32.87 60.34
3.44 35.11 4.27 6.96 8.12 20.74 74.18
3.85 25.91 2.85 7.42 3.43 30.24 78.05
4.33 27.16 3.53 9.32 0.79 30.07 73.85
3.69 26.19 3.80 13.30 1.00 37.97 78.54
4.00 28.50 3.50 15.46 3.59 36.82 91.87
5.80 30.20 5.80 32.1 5.00 21.1 100.00
13.10 43.10 6.20 38.1 28.30 20.4 149.20
16.1 51.4 8.10 45.0 24.4 19.4 164.40
18.8 52.7 7.80 45.4 12.6 26.1 163.40
20.3 45.8 8.60 43.5 9.7 48.3 176.20
21.6 52.6 9.70 57.7 12.3 55.6 209.50
30.9 88.9 10.80 45.5 26.8 84.9 287.80
32.2 110.7 12.10 70.80 11.9 49.3 187.00
41.7 109.8 12.60 97.50 20.5 106.3 388.40
48.2 150.1 13.30 150.1 33.90 120.9 516.50
UN National Accounts Statistics - Sudan Economic Surveys.
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domestically produced and imported goods. So sales taxes (i.e. 
other indirect taxes), profits from imported sugar, and import duties 
collected, will fluctuate. Fluctuations in cotton proceeds^ a principal 
export, will affect both the government’s returns as a partner and 
its profit from cotton marketing.
To see how the government revenue, and the revenue sub-categories 
have been affected by export fluctuations, the percentage trend deviation of 
each of these revenue sub-categories along with the total government 
revenue were regressed on the percentage trend deviations of exports for
a period of 23 years covering 1956 to 1978. Data used are presented in 
Table 4.5. The results1 obtained are:
R2 = .81M T t = 19.02 + 8.28 AX
t(9.356)
AMD = 12.53 + 2.95 Ax
t t
t(8.31)
AED = —15.27 + 1.66 Ax
t t
t( 4.17 8 )
AOT = 13.52 + 5.67 Axt t
t (6.642)
APT = -110.37 + 7.64 AX
t t
t (2.575)
a0R = -2.56 + 2.41 A Xt t
t(4.648)
^GR = 6.76 + 2.95 A Xt t
t(12.3027)
1 The approach used was exploratory and not a rigorous one, and therefore 
the results obtained are tentative and interpreted with due caution.
73 .
CO 4-»
'O  4-1 CO 
ÜJ -H s  
x  a  u  
•H CO o  
^  u  ^
C  3  
03 i J
C  *3 
*-< C 
03 0) 
>  a  
o x 
o  w
U C/3 
(1) 0) 
JZ X  
4J CO 
O  H
4-» CO 
^  OJ 
O -H 
Q. 4-»
4-» CO 
U  0) 
O *H a. 4_) 
E 3 
M  Q
4-1
03 a) 
S 3 
i-* a  
03 oj
O 0> 
O  05
^  °  *  3 ? S S K R 5; S 5 S 3 S S
7  V  1 1
^  ”  5 h S J  ^  ^  2 S S  S S S S S
" "  S ^  7 2 " 7  s 5 S ? i  ^  ?i ;  ^  S
3 £ £ 7 S 2 2 S 3 i n 7 ‘n 7 S £ S ; § 2 2 S 3 7 3
7  7  7  7  1 1
CM CM
r>. md
S S £ 7 7 T 7 S | S £ £ 7 ~ 2 S S [ n ^•—i *-H C \ CM
• ^  I I
h ^  7 5 ^ 5
H " 5 H 5 S ^  S s 7 2 ? °  -
H  S  S  S  5  «  h  ^  S  ;  ^  ^  =5 J ;  ; j  ®  ^  s
S s £ S 2 - ? ^ T 2 2 S S S 7 7 7 7 7 - - - S
" ^ • ^ S ^ s s s s s ^ s s ^ s s s
S S 7 S 2 7 2 7 2 2 5 S 2 7 ^ 7 7 7 2 ” 2 7 p i
o 2 S 2 ^ S 7 2 2 S 2 S 2 S S 3 7 S ^ 2 S §
S 3 S 2 - 7 2 2  n s s y s i s s r ° 2 5
^ ^ S S 2 7 3 3 S 2 S ! o S S 2 7 3 r^ ' ;1' i n v o r ' o o
CO u
CO *H
*H 4-»
CO
CM -H
CO 4-1
er» co
§ so o
u  <
3  -
- .  2
2 2
•H CO
*-* Z
4J -O
CO c
4-» GJ
V) Q.
-  £
CO
•H LJ
U c
C  03
CO E
C C
•H l-i
Lu 0)
uT 5
•H C0
*•» (1)
CO *H
E ^
»- o
O CC
U- 03
*-H CO
co U
a  2
CO C/3
CJ
TO 3  C0
di 3  >N
X 03 CD
•H >  >
U- 0) U
CC 3
”3  CO
C0 03 U
3  -H 
CO C £
4-i 03 O
^  >  3
O 03 O
B  “ 2
►—< 4_)
c c
•  3  CO
w E 3
*-» 3  3
^  3-4 CO
O 03
Cl  >  to
X  0  3
UJ 0  3
74.
where, prefix notation A stands for percentage trend deviation of variable, an
IT = income tax, MD^ = import duties, ED^ = export duties
0T^ _ = other tax and sugar monopoly, PT^ _ = property tax
0R^ _ = other receipts and GR^ _ = government revenue, and 
X^_ = exports •
The short term oscillations of government revenue and the revenue 
sub categories seem to be highly correlated with exports fluctuations.
The correlation coefficient in most of the equations is very high implying 
that all sub categories participated in the transmission of export 
instability to government revenue.
The impact of fluctuations in government revenues on the domestic 
economy depends on the expenditure response of the government. The greatest 
transfer of year-to-year export instability would occur where government 
expenditure increased and decreased in close sympathy with fluctuations 
in revenues. The least transfer would occur where the government followed 
a positive policy of budget surpluses in good years of revenue, and 
deficit, in bad years.
Government expenditure in Sudan for the period (1956-78) does appear 
to have moved in sympathy with government revenue. From Table 4.5 it 
is clear that the percentage trend deviation of government expenditure 
and government revenue moved in the same direction on 20 occasions out 
of 23. The correlation coefficient between them was .96.
This means that according to our tentative procedures and analysis 
government spending was procyclical rather than countercyclical.
When the percentage trend deviation of government expenditure (AGE ) was
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regressed on those of the exports, the result obtained was
AGE = 1.36 + 1.65 AX R2 = .79t t
t (7.9)
This suggests that one of the channels which export instability has 
taken to the internal economy was through its effect on government revenue, 
and hence government expenditure.
4.3.4 Export Instability and Imports
In the Sudan a chronic balance of payments deficit has persisted since 
1956. So a reduction in export earnings has had to be compensated by 
similar cuts in imports. In addition to restrictions which the government 
must introduce in export downturns, the reduction in export producers' 
incomes can reduce their demand for imports.
When percentage movements in exports and imports around the trend 
are compared (Table 4.5), it is only in four years (out of 23) that the 
direction of change was not the same for both. When a lag of one year was 
allowed, only in three cases (out of 23) were the movements in opposite 
directions, which implies that exports and imports tend to move in the 
same direction.
In regressing imports percentage trend deviations (AM), on those of 
exports (AX), the following results emerged:
AM = -1.27 + 2.31 AX t
(9.612)
t R2 = .80
AMt = -5.82 + 2.08 AX x 
(11.3578)
R2 = .86
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The results suggest a highly significant relation between exports fluctuations 
and import fluctuations. However imports did not seem to have dampened 
the response of national income to export changes. One explanation could 
lie in the low marginal propensity to import (found to be .14) which 
will not greatly reduce the multiplier effects of the initial changes in 
exporter incomes.
If the fluctuations of imports force temporary cuts in capital 
goods imports, a decline in export proceeds may in this way frustrate 
investment. The relationship between export oscillations and those of 
fixed capital formation was explored by means of regressing the percentage 
trend deviation of the latter (Al^ _) on the former. The results were:
Al = 6.73 + 3.65 AX R2 = .83
(10.1256)
AI = -1.65 + 2.94 AX R2 = .77
(8.3847)
The results are very significant. However, they were obtained only by 
means of simple regression analysis. We are only looking at relative 
movements of the two variable rather than trying to set an investment 
function. Investment seems to have been another channel transmitting 
export fluctuations to the internal economy.
4.4 Export Instability and Economic Growth
In previous sections,preliminary evidence was presented which showed 
that export fluctuations have caused larger fluctuations in both government 
revenue (and expenditures), and investment. By themselves these findings do n
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necessarily mean that export fluctuations have harmed the economy.
This question is examined in this section. Specifically the relationship 
between export fluctuations and economic rate of growth is explored.
Production theory states that, output (Y) is a function of labour 
(L) and capital (K). Technology is also important. An increase in output 
(economic growth) can be achieved by increasing labor, capital and 
technology.
However, labour generally is in abundant supply in LDCs and 
development theory mostly has concentrated on the role of investment 
and technology in causing growth. The relationship of investment and 
export instability is considered in the next section.
4.4.1 Export Instability and Investments
In the Sudan the industrial sector is as yet minute and elementary, 
and manufactured goods and capital equipment must be imported from abroad 
and paid for mainly by exports. We saw in the last section that import 
fluctuations were significantly linked with export fluctuations. Import 
fluctuations can lead to a discontinuous flow of intermediate and capital 
goods which are essential to the implementation of development plans in 
the country. The bottlenecks on the availability of capital goods, will 
be reflected in a "stop" and "go" approach to executing investment 
projects. This will in turn introduce costly delays and inefficiencies, 
that in the long run reduce the rate of return and impede new investments. 
If this is the situation then one would expect that:
Export Instability ---> Import Instability ---> discontinuous
imports of capital goods ---> Low investments --->low rate of economic
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growth .... (4.A.).
In an attempt, to relate the investment rate of growth to 
export instability, MacBean (1966) estimated the following equation:
I = f(X , FE, MC, MK , MK2) (4.11)
where:
I = rate of growth of fixed capital formation 
X. = export instability
FE = the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves 
MC = The growth rate of the total import capacity of exports 
MK-^ = The capital goods imports to domestic fixed capital 
formation ratio
MK2= The capital goods imports to total imports ratio.
The inclusion of MC as an independent variable is to capture other 
variables that could also affect imports. Not all export earnings 
are used to finance merchandise imports. Some go for repayment of debts, 
services, etc. On the other hand, other sources of capital (donations, 
private and official transfers etc.), can be spent in purchasing imports.
So MC, in addition to exports will include items such as net services, 
private and official donations, long term official capital, etc.
FE, which is the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves should 
be included because a country may release some of its foreign capital 
stock in an export downturn to maintain a constant flow of imports.
On the other hand, some of the foreign reserves could be deposited, in years
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of good export receipts.
X., which measures export instability, is the variable of interest 
in the equation. Export instability was argued to make the imported 
intermediate and capital goods unavailable at crucial moments in the 
implementation of development plans. This means export instability (X_^ ) 
acts on gross fixed capital formation (1) through its influence on 
capital goods availability (MK^ and for MK^) . This leads Lim (1976, 
p. 315) to argue that and MK or MK^ must not appear as independent
variables in the same estimating equation
and I = f (MK, MC FE) 4.12
Moreover MK (i.e. capital goods) from the argument of (4.11) above 
should be presented as
MK = f(X.) 4.13l
It follows that equation (4.12) will be
I = f(X., MC, FE) 4.14
The respective values of the variables in equation 4.14 for Sudan for 
the period 1956-78 are calculated as follows.
Due to the lack of appropriate capital formation deflators and the 
incomplete series of wholesale price indexes (which could have been the 
second best deflator of capital formation), the gross fixed capital format­
ion statistic was deflated by a consumer price index, and the annual increase 
or decrease of the real figures were taken as the dependent variable.
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TABLE 4.6
VARIABLES FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF EXPORT FLUCTUATIONS 
TO FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN SUDAN (1956-1978)
Year I Xi MC FE
1958 0.0898 -0.1417 0.1616 0.2744
1959 0.5908 -0.3625 -0.4133 -0.5022
1960 -0.0912 -0.1518 0.9233 -0.2631
1961 0.0812 0.0937 -0.0304 0.0834
1962 0.2682 -0.0614 -0.0587 0.0550
1963 0.1513 0.2691 0.1039 0.3084
1964 0.1137 0.2336 -0.0659 0.2876
1965 -0.0673 -0.1211 -0.1385 0.1603
1966 -0.2574 -0.1464 -0.0897 0.0452
1967 0.2373 -0.1578 0.2057 0.0404
1968 0.0899 -0.1837 -0.0192 0.1280
1969 -0.1058 -0.0378 0.1435 0.2369
1970 0.0319 -0.0767 -0.1084 0.4066
1971 -0.0507 0.1371 0.1760 -0.2917
1972 -0.1261 0.1086 0.1299 -0.0860
1973 0.1372 0.0015 -0.0825 -0.4818
1974 0.1679 -0.0021 -0.1114 -1.1804
1975 0.2341 -0.6148 0.1342 0.7160
1976 0.6602 -0.4512 0.3327 0.1511
1977 -0.2599 0.2001 -0.0510 0.0165
1978 -0.1376 0.7819 0.2442 0.1268
NOTES:
I = Rate of growth of real fixed capital formation,(Appendix 4.E).
= Fluctuations in the importing power of exports (the deviations from a linear 
trend of merchandize exports deflated by following year's import price) 
(Appendix 4.F).
MC = Rate of growth of import capacity (merchandize exports, net services, private 
and official donations, and long term capital divided by import price index) 
(Appendix 4.G).
FE Annual rate of increase of foreign exchange reserves (Appendix 4.H).
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measures the instability of the importing power of exports 
which is defined as the export proceeds divided by import prices.
Again no complete series of import prices were at hand, so we constructed 
a series of import prices for the Sudan from those of other similar 
countries. (Import price figures, countries chosen, and assumptions 
made are presented in Appendix 4.D).
MC was calculated by adding to merchandise exports the net services, 
private and official transfers, and capital other than reserves. The total 
figures were then divided by import price, and the annual increases were 
computed.
The annual changes of foreign exchange reserves, along with the 
above three variables are presented in Table 4.5. From the figures in the 
table, the estimation of equation (4.14) yields the following 
results:
I = 0.071 - .3966X. - 0.099 MC + 0.105 FE it t t
(2.448)* (0.5075) (.9451)
No. of observations 21 (1958-78)^
R1 2 = .37 
R2 = .26 
DW = 2.0269
F = 2.3088
The parenthesized figures are the (t) values of which the asterisked 
one is significant at 5% level of significance.
1 One observation was missed when export receipts were divided by following
year import prices. The second was omitted when computing the growth rate 
of importing power of export (See Appendix 4.G).
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The DWS indicates that there is no positive serial 
correlation. The F test is not significant. The overall relationship 
explains 37% of the variation in fixed capital formation growth rate 
in the Sudan.
The results must be treated with a high degree of caution not only
because of the insignificance of the F statistic and the relatively low 
2R , but also because X^ measures instability as well as deviations from 
trend in earnings. However, the sign of X^ was as expected, and the t 
test was significant. This provides some evidence that export instability 
in Sudan has adversely affected the rate of growth of capital formation, 
for the period 1956-78.
4.4.2 Export Instability and Rate of Growth of GDP
The argument presented in (4.A) was that export instability can affect 
economic growth through its effects on the availability of capital goods.
To test this version of the argument, Voivodas (1972), pointed out that 
the non availability of capital goods should not be limited only to export 
fluctuations. Fluctuations in the foreign capital inflow, which is an 
alternative source of foreign exchange, will have an identical effect to 
those of export fluctuations. Voivodas started his analysis with a Harrod- 
Domar model as follows:
dQt/Qt = 1/g (It/Qt) 4.15
where dQ = rate of growth of GDP, g the incremental capital-output ratio, 
and It/Qt is the domestic investment expenditure to GDP. It/Qt was made 
to be positively related with capital goods imports to GDP (MKt/Qt)» 
and negatively, with its variance, which is used as a proxy for export
83.
instability
= bx (MKt/Qt) - C (Var MKt/Qt) 4.16
MK^/Q^, was further assumed to be a positive function of exports to GDP 
ratio (X^/Q^), and foreign capital inflow to GDP ratio (F^/Q^).
“ A  = b2 (W  + b2 < W 4.17
The variance of MK^ divided by Q , was then given by the variance 
formula as follows:
(Var MK_/Qt) = b^Var Xt/Qt) + b^Var Ft/Qt)
+ 2b2b3 (Cov[Xt,Ft]/Qt) 4.18
Substituting equation 4.18 for (Var MK /Q^) and equation 4.17 for 
(MK^/Q ) both in equation 4.16 will yield the following equation:
It/Qt = b2(Xt/Qt) + b3 (Ft/Qt) - cb2(Var Xt/Qt)
-cb3(Var Ffc'Qt)-2b2b3 C(Cov[Xt,Ft]/Qt) 4.19
By substitution of equation 4.19 for (It/Qt3 in equation 4.15 
equation 4.20 will be obtained:
eg ■ 0>1b2/g)(Xt/Qt)+ (b1b3/g)(Ft/Qi;)
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- (cbjj/g) (Var Xt/Qt)-(cb^/g) (Var Ft/Qt)
- (2b2b3c/g)(cov[Xt,Ft]/Qt) 4.20
The estimating equation of 4.20, was derived quite systematically 
as shown above. However Lim (1976, p. 318) pointed out that this derivation 
is not consistent with the hypothesis that Viovodas was intending to verify. 
The argument presented in 4.A above, sees export instability as being the 
cause of capital goods imports (MK) instability. The MK instability will 
hinder investment in LDCs because it will result in a discontinuity of 
investment programmes, which depend heavily on the MK. In view of this 
argument, Lim (1976), altered equation 4.16 to be
VQt- bi(tvv 4.16a
and equation 4.17 to become
The substitution of equations 4.16a and 4.17a in equation 4.15 will
produce the following estimating equation:
-*t = (b1b2/g)(Xt/Qt) + (b1b3/g)(Ft/Qt)
-(b c /g)(Var X /Q )-(b c./g)(Var F /Q ) 4.20ai-L t t l l  t t
Equation 4.20a differs from equation 4.20 in not having the
covariance term as an independent variable. This difference is an
important one, because the intention is to find the separate influences
TABLE 4.7
VARIABLES FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
OF EXPORT. CAPITAL INFLOW AND THEIR FLUCTUATIONS TO
THE GROWTH OF GDP IN THE SUDAN (1956-1978)
Year dQt.
Qt
Xit,V Ft/Qt Fit Qt
1957 -0.0093 0.001918 0.000397 0.000572 0.000485
1958 0.0174 0.001391 -0.000149 0.000342 0.000218
1959 0.0303 0.001168 -0.000370 -0.000461 -0.000613
1960 0.0001 0.001735 0.000155 0.000120 -0.000303
1961 0.0499 0.001637 0.000091 0.000380 0.000175
1962 0.0690 0.001429 -0.000056 0.000319 0.001100
1963 0.0370 0.001705 0.000236 0.000470 0.000271
1964 -0.0218 0.001749 0.000209 0.000631 0.000359
1965 0.0553 0.001392 -0.000103 0.000269 -0.000015
1966 0.0245 0.001372 -0.000121 0.000353 0.000050
1967 -0.0992 0.001552 -0.000145 0.000349 -0.000016
1968 0.1981 0.001308 -0.000141 0.000334 0.000007
1969 -0.0344 0.001503 -0.000030 0.000182 -0.000182
1970 0.1579 0.001304 -0.000053 0.000213 -0.000122
1971 0.0694 0.001381 0.000088 0.000205 -0.000129
1972 -0.0364 0.001443 0.000072 0.000229 -0.000138
1973 -0.0657 0.001498 0.000001 -0.000130 -0.000545
1974 0.1020 0.001384 -0.000001 0.000849 0.000453
1975 -0.0216 0.001037 -0.000407 0.001150 0.000725
1976 0.2027 0.000975 -0.000248 0.000391 0.000020
1977 0.0848 0.001251 0.000102 0.000153 -0.000204
1978 0.0278 0.001525 0.000386 0.000214 -0.000150
The annual rate of growth of Real GDP (Appendix 4.1).
Importing power of exports (export receipts divided by following year's 
import price ) divided by Real GDP Statistics (Appendix 4.F)
Deviations of importing power of exports from its linear trend divided 
by Real GDP (Appendix 4.F).
Importing power of foreign capital inflow (Current account deficits, divided 
by current import prices) divided by Real GDP (Appendix 4.J).
Deviations of importing power of capital inflow from its linear trend divided 
by Real GDP (Appendix 4.J).
NOTES:
dQt
Xit
F
/Qt
W
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of export instability and foreign capital instability (obtained by their 
respective variances), and not their joint instability which is represented 
by their covariance term. Further the covariance term will capture some 
of the effects, which should be attributed to the two instability terms 
(Lim, 1976, p. 319).
Equation 4.20a was estimated for the Sudan for the period 1956-78, 
and the respective values of each variable are shown in Table 4.6.
The dQ was obtained from the annual difference in real GDP
<itdivided by the real GDP of that year.
Export receipts (Xt) and foreign capital inflow (defined as the 
Current account deficits) were deflated by import prices to denote 
their purchasing powers, and then divided by real Qt to obtain Xp/Qt and 
Fp/Qp. The yearly deviations of Xp and Fp from their linear trend values 
were taken to denote the instability indexes of X^ _ and F , and these were 
further divided by real Q t to produce (var Xp/Q.p) and (var Fp/Qp).
The results of the analysis for the period under study are:
.548 -  345 .69  Xt / Q t  + 235.875  X i t /Q t
( 3 .3 8 0 2 )  ( 3 . 1 6 5 9 )  ( 2 .0021 )
- 4 8 . 2 7  Fp/Qp + 60 .015  F ^ /Q p  
(0 .6 5 4 1 )  ( 1 .006 )
i2
.39
.25
2.7569
DW = 2.646
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These results are very odd ones. Both exports and capital inflow 
have negative signs, while their instabilities have positive ones. Such 
results are difficult to explain since they suggest that exports and 
capital inflow will negatively contribute to the rate of economic 
growth. So we lagged the independent variables for a year, to allow some 
time for the effects of export instability to be felt within the 
economy. The results obtained are shown below:
dQt/Qt = -.2955 + 205.280 X - 276.0151 Xt-1 t-1
't-1 't-1
( 1.447) (1.5020) ( 1.8979)*
+ 117.2897 F t_1 - 46.2684
't-1
(1.4916)
■t-1
.6906)
No. of observations = 22 (1957-78)
R2
F
DW
.24
.06
1.306
2.598
All the independent variables have the expected signs. The DW 
showed no positive serial correlation. The F test is not significant, 
and the overall relationship explains only 6% of the variation in the rate 
of growth of GDP in Sudan. However, though the estimated equation showed 
poor results, the coefficient of X^t-1 indicates a negative and significant 
(at 5% level) relation between GDP growth rates and export instability 
in the Sudan.
1 The missing observation was due to dividing export receipts by the 
following year import prices.
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When we omit the variables relating to foreign capital inflow, 
the results were:
= .5067 - 325.10 + 219.238 x it
2R = .36
Q t ~t -2t(3.34) t(3.109) t(1.928) R = .29
dQt _ x t - i-.2247 + 181.878 n x it - l  181.6629 ^
ro
Q t V i 2 t-i R2
.20
.12
The adjusted R in both cases increased meaning that the inclusion 
of foreign capital inflow does not improve the explanatory value of 
the regression.
The negative relation obtained between export instability and the rate c 
growth of the Sudanese economy tends to support the findings of the 
previous section. Again with some reservation, we conclude that there is 
evidence that export fluctuations reduced the rate of growth of GDP 
in Sudan for the period 1956-1978.
4.5 Conclusion
The major conclusions of this chapter are:
1. There was a consistent relationship between export instability and 
GNP instability, suggesting that export fluctuations were transmitted 
to the internal economy.
2. The value of the foreign trade multiplier was greater than one, 
meaning that export instability had a more than proportional 
effect on internal economy.
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3. Government revenue and expenditure, imports and capital formation 
fluctuated in the same manner as exports. This caused fluctuations 
in national income. This was offset partly by similar fluctuations 
in imports, but this effect was not large because of the lew 
marginal propensity to import (MPM).
4. In an attempt to determine whether export instability was harmful 
to the growth of the economy, the rate of growth of both capital 
formation and GDP were regressed on export instability. Though 
the overall explanatory powers of the equations were not high, the 
coefficients of export instability were negative and significant.
: This led us to conclude with some caution that export instability 
reduced both the growth rate of capital formation and the.economic 
growth rate of the Sudan.
The analysis in sections 4.3.1 to 4.4.2 is exploratory for various 
reasons mentioned. Hence, the results should be regarded as being 
tentative and indicative of the relationship rather than conclusions.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OBSERVATIONS
5.1 Introduction
In this sub-thesis the problems posed by export instability have 
been considered. Most of the theoretical literature favoured the argument 
that export instability could have an adverse effect on the rate of 
economic growth, although there was some support for the hypothesis that 
instability could in fact stimulate growth. The empirical evidence of 
other studies did not settle the debate. Support for both hypotheses 
was found.
An attempt was made to determine the causes of this divergence 
in empirical results. In doing this it was concluded that cross-sectional 
studies covering a large number of very different countries were unlikely 
to produce reliable results. A single country approach was preferable.
This approach was applied to the Sudan. However some qualifications 
must be made about the data that were used. For example in estimating 
the causes of instability data problems meant that two time periods had 
to be estimated separately. This reduced the degrees of freedom for 
each equation, and it obviously would have been preferable to estimate 
one equation for the whole period. Moreover, reliable deflators could not 
be found. This had two effects. Firstly,current values had to be used 
when assuming the impact of export instability on fluctuations in other 
economic variables. Secondly, an estimation of the real purchasing power 
of export earnings had to be constructed from data available in similar
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countries to Sudan, when examining the impact of fluctuations on 
real growth. These and similar problems mean that the results should 
be considered carefully before policy is examined. It also meant 
that more sophisticated methods of analysis were inappropriate.
The analysis that was used sought only to identify major trends 
rather than to put exact numerical values on them.
Given these qualifications the data suggested that the Sudan faced 
a relatively high degree of export instability in the 60*s and 70's. More 
over the evidence suggested that this instability was transmitted to 
the economy as a whole and adversely affect the rate of economic growth.
If this is accepted, it remains to determine the policy options 
available to Sudan to overcome these problems. These policies are briefly 
introduced in the next section and criteria for judging whether they 
should be applied are discussed. Then sections 5.3 and 5.4 deal with the 
policy options the Sudan government can adopt unilaterally, and with the 
assistance of international organizations respectively. The final section 
will be a brief summary of the major conclusions of the sub-thesis.
4.2 Criteria for Judging the Stabilization Policies
The Sudan could reduce the harmful effects of export instability in 
two ways. It could use 'cushioning' or 'stabilization' policies. The 
objective of the former is to reduce the undesirable impact of instability, 
while the latter aims to reduce export instability (Coppock, 1977).
It must be remembered that stabilization means reducing the short term 
fluctuations around a long term trend. It does not necessarily mean 
fixing them at a given level (Suliman, 1965).
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Before these policies are applied, a government must ensure that the 
instability is of sufficient importance to warrant this action. There is no 
exact formula to determine this. However the government can be guided by the 
country’s past experience and/or the experience of other countries, to have 
an idea about how much export instability the country’s economy can bear, and 
to determine the country’s warning level of export instability (Coppock, 1977)
In making this decision Coppock (1966, 1977), argues that the following 
points should be considered:
1. The policy should be reasonably effective in relieving or reducing 
undesirable export instability and/or cushioning the domestic economy 
against the negative effects of this instability.
2. The policy should be administratively feasible at reasonable costs. For 
example direct control measures against instability (taxes, subsidies, 
quantitative control, price control) are technically difficult to 
administer, and need well-trained experienced and devoted bureaucracies 
for implementation. These are lacked by many LDCs.
3. The financial requirements of the policy, aside from its administrative 
costs, should not be too high.
4. The policy should not be likely to hamper economic development. For 
example, if the government applies an export-quota and starts purchasing 
and accumulating above-quota surpluses, then there would be an 
investment in stocks of commodities, which in addition to being 
unproductive, may in later years have to be destroyed or dumped at 
prices far below the purchase price. Such a policy would continue to 
promote, or at least not discourage investment in primary-product 
industry and delay the movement of resources out of the industry 
(Mikesell, 1963, p. 80).
5. The policy should not be likely to produce undesirable side effects.
For example the promotion or curtailment of exports (through taxes, 
subsidies, quantitative controls, etc.) must take into account the 
possibility of retaliation by foreign government.
These points imply that some form of cost/benefit analysis of 
government intervention should be undertaken. It is by no means clear that 
the benefits to the economy of reducing export fluctuations would be 
greater than the costs of many of the more commonly proposed methods
of stabilization.
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However numerical estimates of such costs and benefits are 
beyond the scope of this study. In the next two sections, some of the 
policies which might reduce the negative impact of export instability 
on Sudan are considered. However, it is assumed that they would not 
be introduced until a thorough study of the costs and benefits had 
been completed.
5.3 National Policies in Sudan
In this section both stabilization and cushioning policies which 
Sudan could pursue by itself will be considered. In the discussion 
we will briefly introduce the theory of each policy, and then see the 
possibility of its implementation in the Sudan.
5.3.1 Policies for Reducing Export Instability
Under this category the reduction in export instability can be 
attained through quantitative controls, foreign exchange controls and 
export taxes and subsidies.
Quantitative control can be a direct measure of reducing instability. 
The government can curtail exports by applying restrictive quantitative 
controls (export-quota), and can expand them by relaxing these measures.
The direct control measures have some disadvantages. They are likely to 
reduce gains from trade, and there is a chance of retaliation by other 
governments.
In an exchange-control system the government can reduce exports by 
decreasing the amount of foreign exchange that exporters are permitted 
to retain. On the other hand, it can promote exports by increasing the
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amount of foreign exchange that exporters are permitted to keep 
(Coppock, 1977, p. 137).
With respect to export taxes, a tax system that subsidized or 
penalized exports as they deviated from a planned expansion path can help 
in achieving stabilization. Export tax will be levied immediately at 
the very source of the cycle; thus it has the merit of tapping income 
fluctuations as they arise. Further it is easy to administer. The problem 
with export tax in Sudan is its low rates (3-5 percent ad valorem). If 
the export tax is to be effective as stabilization means it has to be 
progressive and high. However high export rates may discourage production 
for exports.
5.3.2 Cushioning Policies
The argument presented in the first chapter showed that, an 
upswing of export earnings will increase the producer’s income. Through 
the multiplier effect, this may lead to an increase in aggregate demand. 
When aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, prices will rise, and 
further instabilities can be generated within the economy. Through both the 
monetary and fiscal policies the government can cushion the economy from 
export change repercussions. Let us discuss each in turn.
5.3.2.1 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy can serve as a device of combating the expansionary 
and contractionary effects of export instability through its influence 
on private saving and investments. In times of export shortfalling, 
the central bank can buy security bonds, lower the interest rate, and 
expand the availability of credits to encourage investment and/or reduce
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savings. This increases the injections into, and reduces the with­
drawals from the circular flow of the national income. Selling of 
security bonds, increasing interest rates, and reducing the available 
credits are the devices to be used in the face of export booms.
As it is the case with most LDCs, the monetary policy may be of limited 
scope as a stabilization tool in Sudan. Instruments of monetary policy, such
as open market operations and changes in reserve requirements play 
a very limited role in the country. However credit directives, its expansion
(contraction) with export downs (ups) will be a more suitable 
device, and easy to administer, given the shortage of administrative 
talents (Lees, 1977, p. 98).
5.3.2.2 Fiscal Policy
On the fiscal side,the government can cut overall demand by 
increasing revenue taxes and/or decreasing its own expenditure. On the 
other hand, in an export trough where there is a tendency for aggregate 
demand to decline, the government has to decrease its own revenue, and 
increase its own expenditure to avoid slumps in the national income. In 
most LDCs however, changes in government revenue and/or its expenditure 
is subject to many practical obstacles (legislative, political, 
administrative, statistical).
Fiscal policy as a stabilizing device in Sudan can work through 
both the revenue and the expenditure sides. However a fundamental problem 
of taxation in Sudan, that renders it ineffective as stabilization tool, is 
its heavy reliance on income-inelastic commodity taxation. A tax system
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that would be sensitive to upward and downward changes in national 
income, would be the one with returns which are elastic with respect 
to changes in national income. This is generally supposed to be achieved 
through high income taxes on corporations and individuals. In the case 
of other indirect taxes, the emphasis should be placed on taxing the 
goods with high income elasticity of demand (see MacBean, 1966, p. 237-247).
To improve the stabilizing power of tax structure in the country 
the following actions would be necessary:
1. Improvement of income tax which could be achieved through a
/
reduction of exemption limits, an increase of tax rates, or 
widening the tax base.
2. Introduction of new direct taxes, that grow more than proportional with
national income such as wealth tax and capital gains taxes.
3. To deal directly with export instability, export tax has to be 
high and progressive.
4. The tax administrative machinery in the country needs to be improved 
considerably (Lees, 1977).
Obviously these measures would have significant costs which would 
have to be evaluated properly.
With respect to expenditure policy, public expenditure 
should not follow the current level of revenue. It 
has to be planned with an average revenue level, so the government will 
make surpluses in good revenue years that will be spent in years of
revenue falls.
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Thus fiscal policy would appear to have the best chance of 
successfully reducing the impact of export fluctuations in Sudan. 
Specifically, export taxes and countercyclical government expenditure 
patterns should be evaluated.
Other cushioning devices that do not deal directly with aggregate 
demand regulations are marketing boards and stabilization funds.
Marketing boards smooth the prices and incomes of producers.
They achieve this goal by acting as monopolies which buy all the output 
of the producers at prices fixed by the board and sell the product 
for what it will fetch in the world market. In good years of high world 
prices,the board can make a "profit" that forms a reserve fund. The fund 
can be used as price supplement when prices fall beyond an agreed level.
It also can retain quantities in periods of low price to sell in periods 
of high price. The stabilization funds achieve similar goals by fixing 
a minimum producer prices by Law. It should also be pointed out that 
any marketing board set up to successively undertake the abovementioned 
activities would first require a group of highly talented personnel from 
various fields on its staff.
Before suggesting any of these cushioning and stabilizing policies 
(aside from fiscal policy recommended earlier) let us recall some of 
the results obtained in Chapter Three. Our analysis there revealed that 
fluctuations in export proceeds were caused mainly by fluctuations in 
quantities supplied, which in turn was caused by yield variability.
So in dealing with export receipts fluctuations, a thorough examination 
of causes of yield fluctuations of each commodity and actions towards their 
stabilization can reduce instability a great deal. Pests and weeds control, 
credit availability, extention services, agricultural research, the
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development of subsistence agriculture, and most important the 
improvement of infra-structure particularly transportation will greatly 
help in this area. In addition, improvements in these respects is also 
likely to increase employment, rural development and economic growth generally
Another important finding in Section 3.7.2 which will help us 
to select the appropriate crop for stabilization is that fluctuations 
in export earnings of each commodity was found to be above that of total 
exports. This suggests that the random movements in various commodity 
receipts were offsetting,leading to some stabilizing impact in total 
earnings. So in an attempt to stabilize the proceeds of a commodity (through 
marketing board, stabilization funds, quantitative controls, etc.) the 
government has to be very careful in selecting that commodity and should 
make sure that its stabilization will not destabilize the total export 
earnings.
To check on which commodity by its stabilization, can lessen the 
overall export instability, the procedure which was used by Stein (1979, 
p. 197) was adopted.
The trend values of each export commodity were substituted for their 
actual values and the total export instability was then recalculated.
The objective is to determine how total instability would be affected 
if the government in the Sudan was very successful in stabilizing 
completely the export proceeds of an individual good. The results obtained 
are presented in Table 5.1. It is clear that with the exception of cotton 
in the two periods, and gum in the second period, any attempt for 
stabilization of one commodity would have increased the overall instability. 
Stabilization of cotton which could have greatly reduced the instability
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TABLE 5.1
HYPOTHETICAL INSTABILITY INDEXES
Period of Study -- > 1956-68
Actual Instability Index = 12.42
1969-80
Actual Instability Index = 9.83
Commodity
Stabilized
(X)
Hypothetical
Instability
Index
(Y)
Difference
from
Actual
Index
(Z)
Percentage 
of the 
Difference
(X)
Hypothetical
Instability
Index
(Y)
Difference
from
Actual
Index
(Z)
Percentage 
of the 
Difference
Cotton 4.84 -7.58 -61.03 9.51 -0.32 -3.26
Ground nuts 13.00 +0.58 +4.67 14.49 +4.66 +47.41
Sesame 12.51 +0.09 +0.72 11.20 +1.37 +13.94
Gum Arabic 13.11 +0.69 +5.56 8.36 -1.47 -14.95
Cakes & Meals 12.59 +0.17 +1.37 10.03 +0.20 +2.03
Durra 12.76 +0.34 +2.73 10.19 +0.36 +3.66
Livestocks 13.06 +2.74 +22.06 10.69 +0.86 +8.75
Hides & Skins 13.29 +0.87 +7.00 10.85 + 1.02 +10.36
NOTES:
(X) : The instability index of total export earning when a particular commodity
is stabilized.
(Y) : Obtained by substracting the actual instability index from the hypothetical
one calculated in (X). A negative value means the overall instability 
will be lessenedaud a positive value indicates that it will be increased.
(Z) : Obtained by dividing (Y) by the respective actual instability index,
to obtain the extent to which instability will be increased or decreased.
SOURCE: Tables 5.A, 5.B in the Appendix.
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in the earlier period, would have reduced it very marginally in the second. 
Gum stabilization, in the second period, would have lessened the overall 
instability more than stabilization of cotton. Again the reduction is not 
that great. Thus, it is likely that the costs (e.g. administration, 
transactions and interests) incurred in some of these policies would have 
probably outweighed the benefits.
5.4 International Policies
In dealing with international policies we will follow the same 
pattern as in national policies in considering both stabilization and 
cushioning policies.
5.4.1 Policies for Reducing Export Instability
The international policies for reducing export instability tend 
to be direct control measures. The most popular devices used are the 
bilateral and multi-lateral commodity agreements.
Bilateral agreements .are established between two countries, as 
their name indicates. The two countries will enter into a bilateral 
agreement which covers specified commodities for specified period of 
time, with quantities and prices all specified. In some cases,the 
bilateral agreements cover all or nearly all the trading between the two 
countries as used widely by Communist countries.
Through bilateralism and the pre-determination of prices, the 
countries involved in the agreement can protect their economies from 
the fluctuation of the prices of the commodities included in the agreement. 
In some cases some of these agreements turn to be just expressions
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of intention, while others are binding contracts with bilateral clearing 
accounts that are supposed to be balanced periodically. So these agreements 
as Coppock (1966, p.205) mentioned,could be stabilizing or destabilizing 
depending upon the negotiations, degree of fulfilment and provisions 
for renewing or revising or cancelling the agreements.
Sudan conducted many bilateral agreements with different countries, 
especially Egypt, Eastern European Countries, China and the EEC. A trade
agreement with China in 1975 had guaranteed a market for Sudan 
cotton crop which had been hit by lower world market prices in 1974. The 
country had also made some trade arrangements as a result of signing 
the Lome Conventions with the EEC and renewing it in 1979.
The bilateral arrangements permit the trading partners to maintain 
a domestic price structure that is not totally related to the world 
trade price structure. This means, when Sudan conducts these agreements 
it should negotiate to include those commodities where price fluctuation 
is the major cause of instability i.e. gum and hides and skins. Further 
the agreement should not include a crop in isolation from others as this 
may destabilize the export earning as we saw earlier.
5.4.2 Cushioning Policies
In case of a sharp downturn in export receipts, what international 
measures can be taken to cushion the effects of these declines? The most 
obvious thing is the international borrowing, by which the governments 
can maintain a desired level of imports in times of exports slumps. The 
international borrowing can take a variety of forms, the most popular 
one dealing with export instability is the compensatory financing. The
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compensatory financing may not be as large as some governments would 
like but it is still sizable and can be expanded.
Coppock (1977, p. 138), mentioned three problems related to this 
type of international facility:
1. The funds may not be of sufficient amount;
2. They may not be as readily available, on acceptable terms, 
as the demanders would like; and
3. Although the funds will enable the countries to maintain their 
imports at the desired levels these funds do nothing directly 
to encourage the deteriorating export industries. However with 
all its drawbacks the fund can be a major factor in dealing 
with export instability.
During export upswings, the countries can pay back what they have 
previously borrowed or they can deposit some of the money with the IMF 
for the future outcomes.
The Sudan being a member in IMF, can utilize the funds in 
stabilization of its export earnings. However the heavy reliance on 
the IMF can lead to further economic ties and financial dependence of 
the country.
Other sources of foreign funds that can stabilize export earnings, are
the Lome Convention (STABEX)^" Stabilization System. The aim of the stabex is
to provide a remedy for the adverse effects of unstable export receipts and 
2thus help the ACP countries to secure economic stability, profitability and
steady growth. (Lome Convention, 1975). Under the stabex the EEC provides
1 Stabex is the code name given to the system.
2 ACP = African, Caribbeen and Pacific States.
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a financial aid for stabilization that will be divided into annual instal­
ments, allowing for a certain degree of flexibility between the various 
instalments. Sudan and 24 LDCs are exempted from repayments on the 
transfers they receive.
Being a member of the Arab League, its proximity to oil-rich Arab 
countries, and being an important supplier of food and other exports to 
the Arab Nations, Sudan has a further advantage in getting finance 
from these countries. This has happened over the Seventies through loans 
and grants offered by these countries, which helped maintain imports in 
years of poor export receipts. However with the recent fall in oil prices, 
this may not be an important stabilizing factor in the future.
5.5 Conclusion
The issue of export instability, its causes and supposed effects, 
have been considered of great importance by many international agencies 
(IMF, IBRD, UN, etc.) and have dominated the trade and economic development of 
literature for many years. Traditionally, export instability experienced 
by LDCs was argued to arise from primary product exports, commodity and 
geographic concentration. Its effect was believed to be caused by similar 
disturbances in the economies of these countries, that result in a low 
rate of the economic growth.
The empirical findings of previous studies showed very divergent 
and inconclusive results for both causes and effects. Our study adopted 
the one-country approach to study the problem, and looked at both causes 
and impacts of instability in Sudan for 1958 to 1980 period.
With regard to the causes, the results suggest that commodity 
concentration has not been a major cause of instability. There was evidence that 
geographic concentration may have had a marginal effect on instability.
However, the major cause of instability in export receipts seemed to
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have been variations in the quantity of exports which in turn was 
caused by fluctuations in yield.
In analysing the impact of instability on the internal economy, 
the evidence suggested that export instability had been transmitted 
to the internal economy. The effect of export instability on the rate 
of growth of capital formation and the gross domestic product as a whole 
was found to be negative.
Policies which could ameliorate these impacts were considered. How­
ever it has been argued that a thorough study of the costs and benefits 
of the policies should be undertaken before they are introduced.
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APPENDIX 2.A
STATISTICAL MEASURES OF INSTABILITY
We mentioned in chapter two that part of the confusion about 
both the causes and effects of instability could lie in the different 
indexes employed by different studies. The indexes used by 
Massel (1964), Lawson (1974) and Murray (1978) are mentioned below:
Massell (1964) used two measures of instability. The first 
was the standard error of estimate (square root of the unexplained 
variance) divided by the mean of the observations.
v 2
I = instability index
ut= V t W )
X = Exports in year t
N = number of years
X = arithmetic mean
The second was the average annual percentage rate of change in the 
value of exports (trend corrected):
I = Iw /N, where W = I t ’ t Max[Xt, Xt+1]
Lawson (1974) also used two measures. The first was the standard 
deviation of the observed deviations from an exponential time trend,
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I1
Z(u -U)2 
N
= observed differences in period t, between observed and 
the estimated values.
I, N, t = as above.
The second was the normalized standard error of deviations 
from an estimated linear trend,
I2
N-2 Et_i (X -X)'
X = actual values of exports in year t 
X = the estimated value of exports 
N, X, t = as above.
Murray (1978) employed 5 different indexes. The first was 
the Coppock index:
Cl = [(antilog Jvlog) - 1] x 100 
where vlog = (X^X)2
Xt = log(Xt+1/Xt) and
X = -pr XN-l t=l t
= (l0g Xn - log V
Cl = Coppock Index
All other variables are as above.
1C7-.
The second was the MacBean Index
MI - iPT Et=3 (lxt - 
MI = MacBean Index
MA^ _ = is a five year moving average of the X^ _ centred on year t. 
X = as above. - •
The third was the normalized standard error used by Massel and 
Lawson earlier.
The fourth was the deviations of values from the estimates obtained 
when a constant percentage growth rate is allowed for. The parameters 
a and b in the equation are obtained by least squares
X = a e t
bt
or Log X^ = log a + bt
The Index I is given by
I  Zt=l (Xt-aebt)2 X 100/X
The variables are as above.
The final was the mean absolute deviation of values from the 
estimates obtained from a moving five year average of logarithmic values
I_ = XN 2 (IX -ML A 1/MLA )5 N-4 t=3 t t t
MLA t the natural value of a five year moving average of the 
logarithmic trend.
All other variables are as above.
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APPENDIX 3.A
QUANTITIES OF SUDANESE EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES (1956-1980)
Year Cotton Ground
Nuts
Sesame Gum
Arabic
Cakes 
6 Meals
Dura Live-
Stock
Hides & 
Skins
1956 115 64.10 30.41 48.79 46.56 18.10 208.05 3.76
1957 63 73.15 41.00 42.92 54.36 58.95 193.14 4.37
1958 79 63.88 29.88 48.07 56.44 12.27 129.50 3.49
1959 180 64.56 44.73 42.58 73.13 73.06 148.14 4.66
1960 106 67.34 76.37 51.81 63.78 170.98 115.32 4.34
1961 106 86.29 62.80 51.24 88.23 93.03 132.78 4.28
1962 160 121.30 77.22 38.75 n.a. 75.52 n.a. n.a.
1963 180 117.97 69.65 47.12 142.03 73.84 95.21 6.05
1964 115 156.45 101.41 53.64 170.43 61.23 93.28 3.47
1965 117 159.38 70.59 57.60 165.80 111.70 237.15 5.47
1966 143 107.94 n.a. 54.75 180.23 78.65 180.48 5.89
1967 172 108.86 75.50 51.73 172.63 .59 228.78 4.24
1968 184 88.26 84.72 50.74 222.26 54.84 226.24 5.01
1969 954 82.14 112.60 49.04 185.83 1.78 237.91 15.70
1970 1300 65.89 83.75 61.45 250.43 0 188.37 5.76
1971 1473 115.06 84.44 41.97 178.59 32.43 149.70 8.83
1972 1292 116.82 83.13 39.24 169.12 55.28 153.79 5.70
1973 1219 138.43 101.86 33.94 169.83 93.95 229.10 8.16
1974 417 99.05 83.51 20.79 57.74 89.22 253.79 5.28
1975 783 204.96 56.62 15.64 161.78 45.08 72.60 6.04
1976 969 282.80 88.76 26.17 179.69 74.45 44.77 6.03
1977 1008 143.27 92.99 33.31 151.62 103.83 169.93 8.02
1978 752 97.21 75.96 38.76 160.66 46.92 278.11 4.86
1979 999 37.42 16.02 44.15 147.34 172.02 193.40 3.31
1980 617 22.09 57.19 26.23 177.68 286.25 361.87 4.28
NOTES:
- Quantities are in thousands of metric tons
Cotton (1956-1968) in tons - and from (1969-1980) in bales 
Live stocks, thousands of heads 
n.a. = not available
SOURCES: UN - Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (1956-68).
Bank of Sudan - Annual Report for Years (1969-80)
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APPENDIX 3.B
UNIT VALUES OF SUDANESE EXPORTS BY COMMODITY (1956-1980) 
(EXPRESSED IN SUDANESE POUNDS (LS)
Year Cotton Ground
Nuts
Sesame Gum
Arabic
Cakes 
6 Meals
Dura Live-
Stocks
Hides 
& Skins
1956 363 59.13 67.41 109 20.83 19.89 7.31 230
1957 364 64.25 72.93 109 17.11 20.48 10.65 200
1958 282 53.69 37.63 108 18.78 23.64 12.34 200
1959 223 55.45 61.48 120 22.97 27.86 7.36 190
1960 313 56.19 60.10 135 21.79 16.38 12.75 210
1961 294 62.23 66.56 120 21.88 15.99 11.15 210
1962 272 55.07 73.04 118 n .a. 19.59 n .a. n . a.
1963 253 54.25 69.35 121 24.64 21.13 10.92 210
1964 281 58.68 63.60 127 24.23 25.15 9.33 280
1965 267 53.96 67.29 131 23.88 21.84 8.39 230
1966 243 67.26 n . a . 131 25.30 23.78 9.92 270
1967 238 59.80 86.49 161 23.98 33.90 8.96 340
1968 264 52.12 73.42 155 20.20 19.51 9.28 300
1969 52 72.92 71.23 177 22.49 22.47 9.78 320
1970 49 83.62 77.61 148 22.20 n . a . 12.32 298
1971 47 81.09 94.74 191 24.97 33.61 13.43 220
1972 56 83.12 110.31 231 25.96 30.03 14.24 580
1973 69 93.84 105.14 218 46.52 31.11 14.10 740
1974 103 183.34 197.70 686 38.80 49.32 17.69 720
1975 90 167.74 210.88 483 32.02 49.47 14.19 530
1976 101 137.87 194.80 429 28.33 42.58 13.18 620
1977 129 201.02 196.37 406 51.64 45.94 25.48 540
1978 140 213.25 252.50 382 47.70 56.69 28.77 800
1979 151 266.44 392.01 422 49.34 78.60 35.68 1110
1980 187 267.99 434.78 691 74.46 150.29 45.71 1550
NOTES:
Unit values are obtained 
figures in Appendix 3.A.
by dividing the value figures in Table 3.1) by the quantity
- Unit values of cotton, are per ton for the period (1956-68) and per bale (1969-1980).
Unit values of livestock are per head.
SOURCES: Table 3.1, and Appendix 3.A.
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APPENDIX 3.C
AREA AND YIELD OF SUDAN MAIN CROPS (1969-1980)
COTTON : GROUND NUTS SESAME DURA
Year Acreage ; Yield : Acreage ’ Yield : Acreage Yield : Acreage Yield
1969 1118 586 782 252 1090 112 2780 255
1970 1256 537 1083 :377 1356 129 4345 345
1971 1209 604 903 389 1773 159 4698 325
1972 1219 561 1527 251 1805 151 4722 458
1973 1141 487 1558 313 2801 121 3956 339
1974 1194 562 1724 315 2167 111 5208 312
1975 1228 524 1717 510 2199 128 5864 297
1976 988 326 2066 451 2291 104 6179 328
1977 1006 456 1894 391 2288 111 6287 286
1978 1120 499 2629 388 2349 104 6662 303
1979 1036 392 2330 348 2061 104 7202 329
1980 996 318 2352 362 1989 105 6349 263
NOTES:
Area in thousands feddans (1 feddan =1.03 acres). 
Yield in thousands metric tons.
SOURCE: Bank of Sudan - Annual Reports, different issues.
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APPENDIX 4.A
FOREIGN TRADE MULTIPLIER
To formally derive the foreign trade multiplier, let us start with the national income identity
Y 5 C + I + G  + X -  M -  T 4.A.1
Let us assume that consumption function, import function and tax functions are:
Consumption C = a +  cY,
Imports M = b +  mY,
Taxes T = d +  t Y .
Inserting these functions into (4.A.1) above gives the following equation: 
Y + a + c Y + I + G + X - b - m Y - d - t Y .  4.A . 2
If an autonomous change in demand occurs, income will move to a new equilibrium. The difference 
between the two equilibriums will be:
Y 2 - Y x = a + c Y 2 + I2 + C 2 + X 2 - b - m Y 2 - d - tY2
-a - cY. - I - G x - X x + b + raYx + d + tYx 4.A . 3
If the autonomous change was in exports ( X ) , and if the income changes induce no further change 
in exports, nor any change in investment or government expenditure, the change in equilibrium 
income will be:
AY = CAY + AX - mAY - tAY 4.A.Y,
(AY = Y 2 - Yi throughout equation 4.A . 3)
AY AX_________[ (1-c) +  m +  t) ] 4.A.5
Substituting S" marginal propensity to save' into place of (1-c) (C as shown above is marginal propensity 
to consume) then equation 4.A.5 will be written as:
AY AX 1S + m +  t 4 . A . 6
This was the foreign trade multiplier used by MacBean (1966, p. 93).
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APPENDIX 4.A.1
FOREIGN TRADE MULTIPLIER
Another Formula
Let us start with the same national income identity
Y E C + I + G + X - M - T .  4.A.1.1
In addition to the three functions inserted earlier let us insert a fourth 
one»period investment function of the form
I = e + fY.
Equation 4.A.1.1 will be
Y = a + cY + e + fY + G + X -  b - m Y - d - t Y  4.A.1.2
With the same method used earlier, and with the assumption that change in 
export will induce further changes in investment whereas government 
expenditure is not affected, then the change in equilibrium income will 
be
AY = cAY + f AY + AX - mAY - tAY 4.A.1.3
AY AX_________(1-c) - f + m + t 4.A.1.4
AY AX_______s + m - f + t 4.A.1.5
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APPENDIX 4.B
THE OBSERVATIONS OF SOME OF THE PARAMETERS OF FOREIGN TRADE MULTIPLIER OF SUDAN (1956-78)
(L S 000,000)
Year Mx tx ty
1956 1.45 4.89 21.81
1957 2.55 5.30 22.51
1958 3.64 9.40 25.09
1959 3.30 6.00 23.52
1960 2.72 9.23 40.11
1961 3.09 8.95 39.02
1962 4.83 4.27 36.73
1963 1.67 4.66 22.81
1964 1.52 4.27 49.17
1965 0.82 2.85 44.96
1966 0.95 3.53 40.25
1967 0.55 3.80 36.77
1968 0.32 3.50 51.55
1969 0.35 5.80 73.10
1970 0.82 6.20 122.6
1971 0.62 8.10 136.9
1972 1.23 7.80 129.5
1973 1.56 8.60 119.3
1974 4.44 9.70 144.2
1975 6.07 10.80 192.1
1976 6.40 12.10 225.6
1977 7.89 12.60 269.5
1978 5.75 13.30 382.3
SOURCES:
hoc = re-export figures, IMF — IFS, (1956-1968). Bank of Sudan-Annual Reports, (196^-1978).
tx = Export Duties - UN National Accounts Statistics
ty “ Government tax revenue - excluding export duties - UN National Accounts Statistics
All revenue sub categories were included because: they will be affected by changes in export
earnings, see section 4.3.3.
No figures are available for the proportion of exports repatriated abroad (Px). As far as we 
know nothing of^export sector is foreign owned «* result in expatriated profit - However instead 
of assuming Px = 0, it is assumed to be 0.01.
APPENDIX 4.C
MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO IMPORT AND TO CONSUME
r
5 US 
Import 
Price
Exchange
Rate
LS LS
Import Constant 
Price Import
Price 
1975
LS
Value of 
Imports
LS
Import at 
1975
Constant
Prices
LS
G.N.P.
LS
Consumer
Price
LS LS
G.N.P. Consumption
at
1975
Prices
Consumption 
at Constant 
Prices
6 38 2.8716 13.23 32.46 40.40 124.46 299.3 31.8 941.2 247.5 778.3
7 40 2.8716 13.93 34.17 56.56 165.55 299.3 32.1 932.4 247.5 771.0
8 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 53.12 159.42 329.0 34.6 950.9 267.7 773.7
9 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 50.95 152.91 338.1 34.5 980.0 288.0 834.8
0 40 2.8716 13.93 34.17 56.91 166.55 339.2 34.6 980.3 278.0 803.5
1 38 2.8716 13.23 32.46 73.98 227.91 385.0 37.6 1023.9 307.4 817.6
2 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 79.76 239.37 415.7 38.2 1088.2 326.0 853.4
3 41 2.8716 14.28 35.03 88.60 252.93 450.0 40.0 1125.0 345.9 864.8
4 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 85.26 232.13 459.6 41.6 1104.8 361.4 868.8
5 43 2.8716 14.63 35.89 64.54 179.83 471.5 40.5 1164.2 370.9 915.8
6 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 69.16 188.29 492.0 41.2 1194.2 382.2 927.7
7 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 66.37 180.69 503.5 45.8 1099.3 342.7 748.2
8 44 2.8716 15.32 37.59 80.10 213.09 541.1 41.2 1313.3 371.7 902.2
9 45 2.8716 15.67 38.44 79.75 207.47 589.3 46.4 1270.0 409.2 881.9
D 47 2.8716 16.37 40.16 89.39 222.58 697.1 48.2 1446.3 479.1 994.0
1 50 2.6449 18.90 46.37 103.07 222.28 757.9 48.9 1549.9 528.1 1080.0
2 54 2.6449 20.42 50.10 105.28 210.14 828.7 55.5 1493.2 634.5 1143.2
P 65 2.3804 27.31 67.52 135.58 200.80 888.5 64.0 1388.3 611.0 954.7
ft 88 2.3454 37.52 92.05 220.98 240.07 1236.4 80.7 1532.1 846.0 1048.3
5 100 2.4536 40.76 100 321.31 321.31 1495.1 100 1495.1 1231.3 1231.3
> 94 2.4716 38.03 93.30 304.81 326.70 1827.9 101.7 1797.3 1340.6 1318.2
7 101 2.3640 42.72 104.81 336.14 320.71 2322.9 118.7 1956.9 1827.1 1539.2
i 111 1.9190 57.84 141.90 401.30 282.80 2868.3 142.3 2015.6 2379.5 1672.2
S :
Import prices are in US Dollars, they have been divided by exchange rates to get prices in LS (Sudanese Pounds).
if ter obtaining import prices 
/ere adjusted accordingly.
in L S in Column (4), the year 1975, has been taken as the base year and the other figures
larginal propensity to consume MPC = ^  = .73, AY ’ (obtained from C = 40 + .73 G.NP. , both at constant prices ,
larginal propensity to import MPM = am -  -14, (obtained from M = 45 + 14 G.N.P., both at constant prices)
ICE: IMF - International Financial Statistics - various issues.
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APPENDIX 4.C
MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO IMPORT AND TO CONSUME
Year
S US 
Import 
Price
Exchange
Rate
LS
Import
Price
LS
Constant
Import
Price
1975
LS
Value of 
Imports
LS
Import at 
1975
Constant
Prices
LS
C.N.P.
LS
Consumer
Price
LS
C.N.P.
at
1975
Prices
LS
Consumption Consumption 
at Constant 
Prices
1956 38 2.8716 13.23 32.46 40.40 124.46 299.3 31.8 941.2 247.5 778.3
1957 40 2.8716 13.93 34.17 56.56 165.55 299.3 32.1 932.4 247.5 771.0
1958 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 53.12 159.42 329.0 34.6 950.9 267.7 773.7
1959 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 50.95 152.91 338.1 34.5 980.0 288.0 334.8
1960 40 2.8716 13.93 34.17 56.91 166.55 339.2 34.6 980.3 278.0 803.5
1961 38 2.8716 13.23 32.46 73.98 227.91 385.0 37.6 1023.9 307.4 817.6
1962 39 2.8716 13.58 33.32 79.76 239.37 415.7 38.2 1088.2 326.0 853.4
1963 41 2.8716 14.28 35.03 88.60 252.93 450.0 40.0 1125.0 345.9 864.8
1964 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 85.26 232.13 459.6 41.6 1104.8 361.4 868.8
1965 43 2.8716 14.63 35.89 64.54 179.83 471.5 40.5 1164.2 370.9 915.8
1966 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 69.16 188.29 492.0 41.2 1194.2 382.2 927.7
1967 43 2.8716 14.97 36.73 66.37 180.69 503.5 45.8 1099.3 342.7 748.2
1968 44 2.8716 15.32 37.59 80.10 213.09 541.1 41.2 1313.3 371.7 902.2
1969 45 2.8716 15.67 38.44 79.75 207.47 589.3 46.4 1270.0 409.2 881 .9
1970 47 2.8716 16.37 40.16 89.39 222.58 697.1 48.2 1446.3 479.1 994.0
1971 50 2.6449 18.90 46.37 103.07 222.28 757.9 48.9 1549.9 528 . 1 1080.0
1972 54 2.64 4,9 20.42 50.10 105.28 210.14 828.7 b b . 5 1493.2 634.5 1143.2
1973 65 2.3804 27.31 67.52 135.58 200.80 888.5 64.0 1388.3 611.0 954.7
1974 88 2.3454 37.52 92.05 220.98 240.07 1236.4 80.7 1532.1 846.0 1048.3
1975 100 2.4536 40.76 100 321.31 321.31 1495.1 100 1495.1 1231.3 1231.3
1976 94 2.4716 38.03 93.30 304.81 326.70 1827.9 101.7 1797.3 1340.6 1318.2
1977 101 2.3640 42.72 104.81 336.14 320.71 2322.9 118.7 1956.9 1827.1 1539.2
1978 111 1.9190 57.84 141.90 401.30 282.80 2868.3 142.3 2015.6 2379.5 1672.2
NOTES:
Import prices are in US Dollars, they have been divided by exchange rates to get price« ln LS (Sudanese Pounds).
After obtaining import prices in L S in Column (4), the year 1975, has been taken as the base year and the other figures
were adjusted accordingly.
Marginal propensity to consume MFC - ■ .73, (obtained from C ■ 40 ♦ .73 C.NP., both at constant prices/.
AMMarginal propensity to import HPM » —  ■ .14, (obtained from M - 45 ♦ .14 C.N.P., both at constant prices}.
SOURCE: IMF - International Financial Statistics - various issues.
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APPENDIX 4.D
COMPUTATION1 OF IMPORT PRICE
To obtain the importing power of exports, export receipts have 
to be divided by import prices. A complete series of the import prices 
for the Sudan could not be obtained. So we tried to construct the import 
prices for the Sudan from those of similar countries.
The assumption wemade is that though different LDCs tend to produce 
and export, divergent commodities, their imports tend to be more or less 
similar.
The countries with similar imports to Sudan were obtained from 
World Tables, published by the World Bank (1975). The percentages of 
food and raw materials, fuels and lubricants, machinery and equipment 
and other manufactured products, were provided therein.
Those countries which import similar percentage of the four 
categories as Sudan,were selected. The countries were Ethiopia, Kenya,
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. The import prices of each country were obtained 
from IMF, IFS; the average was worked out and taken to denote Sudan import 
prices. The figures are provided in the following page.
Year
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
116.
Ethiopia Kenya Sri Lanka Tunisia Sudan
Estimated
57 
59 
59
58
59
56
57
58
57
58
60 
61 
63 
62 
63 
67 
74 
85 
90
100
106
114
127
34
35 
34
34
35
32
33 
35
35
36 
36 
36
36
37 
37 
41 
45 
56 
81
100
102
112
126
27
30
27
27
27
27
27
30
36 
33
33 
32
34
37 
34
42
43 
54
91 
100
75
85
92
34
37 
34
36
38
37
38
41 
43
42
43
43
44
45 
47 
49 
54 
65 
83
100
92
94
99
38 
40
39
39
40
38
39
41 
43
42
43
43
44
45 
47 
50 
54 
65 
88
100
94
101
111
IMF - International Financial Statistics - 1982.
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APPENDIX 4.E
ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
Year Gross Fixed
Capital
Formation
Consumer
Prices
G.F.C.F. 
at 1975 
Prices
Annual 
Increase in 
Real
G.F.C.F.
Annual 
Rate of 
Increase 
of Real 
G.F.C.F.
19-56 21.2 31.8 66.67
1957 21.2 32.1 66.04 -.63 -.0095
1958 24.9 34.6 71.97 5.93 .0898
1959 39.5 34.5 114.49 42.52 .5908
1960 36.0 34.6 104.05 -10.44 -.0912
1961 42.3 37.6 112.50 8.45 .0812
1962 54.5 38.2 142.67 30.17 .2682
1963 65.7 40.0 164.25 21.58 .1513
1964 76.1 41.6 182.93 10.68 .1137
1965 69.1 40.5 170.62 -12.31 -.0673
1966 52.2 41.2 126.70 -43.92 -.2574
1967 71.8 45.8 156.77 30.07 .2373
1968 70.4 41.2 170.87 14.10 .0899
1969 70.9 46.4 152.80 -18.07 -.1058
1970 76.0 48.2 157.68 4.88 .0319
1971 73.2 48.9 149.69 -7.99 -.0507
1972 72.6 55.5 130.81 -18.88 -.1261
1973 95.2 64.0 148.75 17.94 .1372
1974 140.2 80.7 173.73 24.98 .1679
1975 214.4 100.0 214.40 40.67 .2341
1976 362.0 101.7 355.95 141.55 .6602
1977 312.7 118.7 263.44 -92.51 -.2599
1978 323.3 142.3 227.20 -36.24 -.1376
I = Growth Rate of Fixed Capital Formation.
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics ,National Accounts , 1982 issue.
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APPENDIX 4.F
FLUCTUATIONS IN THE IMPORTING POWER OF EXPORTS
Year Exports Import
Prices
Mt
$ US
Importing 
Power of X 
Xt/Mt+1
Exchange
Rate
L S
T mporting 
Power of 
Exports 
Xt
Time
(t)
Importing 
'Power 
of Exports
Xt
Trend 
Value of 
Importing 
Power of 
Exports
x t
Deviation of Import­
ing Power from
T r e n d  < x t- x t )
xit
1956 205.9 38 2.8716
1957 148.1 40 5.1475 2.8716 1.7926 0 1.7926 1.4219 0.3707
1958 128.1 39 3.7974 2.8716 1.3224 1 1.3224 1.4641 -0.1417
1959 195.3 39 3.2846 2.8716 1.1438 2 1.1438 1.5063 -0.3625
1960 183.8 40 4.8825 2.8716 1.7003 3 1.7003 1.5485 0.1518
1961 176.0 38 4.8368 2.8716 1.6844 4 1.6844 1.5907 0.0937
1962 228.9 39 4.5128 2.8716 1.5715 5 1.5715 1.6329 -0.0614
1963 240.9 41 5.5829 2.8716 1.9442 6 1.9442 1.6751 0.2691
1964 197.6 43 5.6023 2.8716 1.9509 7 1.9509 1.7173 0.2336
1965 204.4 42 4.7048 2.8716 1.6384 8 1.6384 1.7595 - 0 . 1 2 1 1
1966 208.2 43 4.7535 2.8716 1.6553 9 1.6553 1.8017 -0.1464
1967 215.1 43 4.8419 2.8716 1.6861 10 1.6861 1.8439 -0.1578
1968 244.3 44 4.8886 2.8716 1.7024 11 1.7024 1.8861 -0.1837
1969 256.2 45 5.4289 2.8716 1.8905 12 1.8905 1.9283 -0.0378
1970 284.3 47 5.4511 2.8716 1.8983 13 1.8983 1.9705 -0.0767
1971 309.0 50 5.6860 2.6449 2.1498 14 2.1498 2.0127 0.1371
1972 324.7 54 5.7222 2.6449 2.1635 15 2.1635 2.0549 0.1086
1973 441.1 65 4.9954 2.3804 2.0986 16 2.0986 2.0971 0.0015
1974 384.4 88 5.0125 2.3454 2.1372 17 2.1372 2.1393 - 0 . 0 0 2 1
1975 411.8 100 3.8440 2.4536 1.5667 18 1.5667 2.1815 -0.6148
1976 588.8 94 4.3809 2.4716 1.7725 19 1.7725 2.2237 -0.4512
1977 658.2 101 5.8297 2.3640 2.4660 20 2.4660 2.2659 0.2001
1978 563.0 111 5.9297 1.9190 3.0900 21 3.0900 2.3081 0.7819
$ US: US dollar, L S: Sudanese Pound.
X^ : Importing power of exports
X : Deviations of importing power of exports from its linear-trend (taken as a measure of instability) 
SOURCE: IMF - International Financial Statistics - 1982 issue.
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APPENDIX 4.H
ANNUAL RATE OF DECREASE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
Year Foreign
Reserves
Annual
Decrease
Annual 
Rate of 
Decrease 
(FE)
1956 191.1
1957 121.0 70.9 0.3695
1958 87.8 33.2 0.2744
1959 131.9 -44.1 -0.5022
1960 166.6 -34.7 -0.2631
1961 152.7 13.9 0.0834
1962 144.3 8.4 0.0550
1963 99.8 44.5 0.3084
1964 71.1 28.7 0.2876
1965 59.7 11.4 0.1603
1966 57.0 2.7 0.0452
1967 54.7 2.3 0.0404
1968 47.7 7.0 0.1280
1969 36.4 11.3 0.2369
1970 21.6 14.8 0.4066
1971 27.9 -6.3 -0.2917
1972 30.3 -2.4 -0.0860
1973 44.9 -14.6 -0.4818
1974 97.9 -53.0 -1.1804
1975 27.8 70.1 0.7160
1976 23.6 4.2 0.1511
1977 23.1 .5 0.0165
1978 20.5 2.6 0.1268
FE = Annual rate of decrease of foreign reserves.
The reduction in foreign reserves was given the positive sign, 
meaning that some of reserves was released for buying imports, 
i.e. reduction of reserves is positively related to capital goods 
imports and vice versa.
SOURCE: IMF, Financial Statistics - 1982 issue.
121
APPENDIX 4.1
THE RATE OF GROWTH OF REAL G.D-P.
Year G.D.P. Consumer
Prices
G.D.P at
1975
Prices
Annual 
Increase 
in Real 
G.D.P.
Annual 
Rate of 
Increase 
Real G.D.
1956 300 31.8 943.4
1957 300 32.1 934.6 -8.80 -0.0093
1958 329 34.6 950.9 16.30 0.0174
1959 338 34.5 979.7 28.80 0.0303
1960 339 34.6 979.8 .10 0.0001
1961 386.8 37.6 1028.7 48.90 0.0499
1962 420 38.2 1099.5 70.80 0.0690
1963 456.2 40.0 1140.5 41.00 0.0370
1964 464.1 41.6 1115.6 -24.90 -0.0218
1965 476.8 40.5 1177.3 61.70 0.0553
1966 496.9 41.2 1206.1 28.80 0.0245
1967 497.6 45.8 1086.5 -119.60 -0.0992
1968 536.3 41.2 1301.7 215.20 0.1981
1969 583.2 46.4 1256.9 -44.80 -0.0344
1970 701.5 48.2 1455.4 198.50 0.1579
1971 761.1 48.9 1556.4 101.00 0.0694
1972 832.4 • 55.5 1499.8 -56.60 -0.0364
1973 896.8 64.0 1401.3 -98.50 -0.0657
1974 1246.2 80.7 1544.2 142.90 0.1020
1975 1510.8 100 1510.8 -33.40 -0.0216
1976 1848.0 101.7 1817.1 306.30 0.2027
1977 2339.7 118.7 1971.1 154.00 0.0848
1978 2882.7 142.3 2025.8 54.70 0.0278
Last column was computed as V i  - Qt
Qt
SOURCE: IMF - International Financial Statistics - National Accounts - 1982 issue.
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APPENDIX 4.J
THE FOREICN CAPITAL INFLOW, IT*S DEVIATION FROH TREND
Year
$ US
Capital
Inflow
$ US
Import
Prlcea
$ US
Importing
Power
Exchange
Rate
LS Ft 
Importing 
Power
Time ' T rend
Fi
Actual
-Trend
1956 -52 38 -1.3684 2.8716 -0.4765 0 0.0559 -0.5324
1957 62 40 1.5500 2.8716 0.5398 ] 0.0868 0.4530
1958 36.4 39 0.9333 2.8716 0.3250 2 0.1177 0.2073
1959 -50.6 39 -1.2974 2.8716 -0.4518 3 0.1486 -0.6004
1960 -13.5 40 -0.3375 2.8716 -0.1175 4, 0.1795 -0.2970
1961 42.6 38 1.1211 2.8716 0.3904 5 0.2104. 0.1800
1962 39.3 39 1.0077 2.8716 0.3509 6 0.2413 0.1096
1963 63.1 41 1.5390 2.8716 0.5359 7 0.272; 0.3087
1969 86.9 43 2.0209 2.8716 0.7038 8 0.3032 U.400n
1965 38.2 42 0.9095 2.8716 0.3167 9 0.3341 -0.0174
1966 52.5 43 1.2209 2.8716 0.4252 10 0.3650 0.0602
1967 46.8 43 1.0884 2.8716 0.3790 11 0.3969 -0.016V
1968 55.0 44 1.2500 2.8716 0.4353 12 0.4268 0.0086
1969 29.6 45 0.6578 2.8716 0.2291 13 0.4,577 -0.2286
1970 41.9 47 0.8915 2.8716 0.3105 14, 0.4886 -0.1781
1971 42.1 50 0.8420 2.6449 0.3184, 15 0.5195 -0.2011
1972 49.1 54 0.9093 2.6449 0.3438 16 0.5504 -0.2066
1973 -28.2 65 -0.4338 2.3804 -0.1822 17 0.5813 -0.7635
1974 270.7 88 3.0761 2.3454 1.3116 18 0.6123 0.6993
1975 426.4 100 4.2640 2.4536 1.7379 19 0.6432 1.0947
1976 165.1 94 1.7564 2.4716 0.7106 20 0.6741 0.0365
1977 72.2 101 0.7140 2.3640 0.3020 21 0.7050 -0.4030
1978 92.1 111 0.8297 1.9190 0.4324 22 0.7359 -0.3035
$ US - U.S. Dollar 
LS • Sudanese Pound
Fc * Importing power of foreign capital Inflow
Fi ' (Mki*“.S*51LÜ.SS1Si1I5StJ5ITii{J.lln,*r trend
SOURCES: IMF - International Financial Stacietlce - 1982.
IMF - Balance of Paymenc Statiatica (varioua iasuea).
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APPENDIX 5.A.
THE TREND VALUES OF SUDAN EXPORTS (1956-80)
Year Cotton Ground
Nuts
Sesame Gum
Arabic
Cakes 
& Meals
Dura Live-
Stocks
Hides & 
Skins
1956 30.52 3.92 2.32 4.66 .57 1.26 1.35 .69
1957 31.43 4.22 2.68 4.93 .93 1.28 1.38 .76
1958 32.35 4.52 3.05 5.21 1.29 1.31 1.41 .82
1959 33.26 4.82 3.42 5.48 1.64 1.33 1.44 .89
1960 34.18 5.13 3.79 5.75 2.00 1.35 1.47 .96
1961 35.10 5.43 4.16 6.02 2.36 1.37 1.50 1.02
1962 36.01 5.73 4.52 6.28 2.72 1.40 1.53 1.09
1963 36.93 6.03 4.89 6.56 3.08 1.42 1.56 1.15
1964 37.84 6.33 5.26 6.83 3.43 1.44 1.59 1.22
1965 38.76 6.63 5.63 7.10 3.79 1.47 1.62 1.29
1966 39.67 6.94 5.99 7.37 4.15 1.49 1.65 1.35
1967 40.59 7.24 6.73 7.64 4.51 1.51 1.67 1.42
1968 41.50 7.54 7.10 7.91 4.86 1.53 1.70 1.48
1969 47.11 10.51 6.78 6.59 3.43 -5.29 -0.10 2.09
1970 54.52 11.49 7.90 7.53 3.93 -3.13 0.74 2.38
1971 61.93 12.46 9.03 8.46 4.43 -0.96 1.57 2.67
1972 69.35 13.44 10.15 9.39 4.92 1.21 2.41 2.95
1973 76.76 14.41 11.28 10.32 5.42 3.37 3.24 3.24
1974 84.18 15.39 12.40 11.25 5.92 5.54 4.08 3.53
1975 91.59 16.36 13.53 12.18 6.42 7.71 4.91 3.82
1976 99.00 17.34 14.65 13.11 6.92 9.87 5.75 4.11
1977 106.42 18.31 15.78 14.05 7.42 12.04 6.58 4.39
1978 113.83 19.29 16.91 14.98 7.91 14.21 7.42 4.68
1979 121.25 20.26 18.03 15.91 8.41 16.37 8.25 4.67
1980 128.65 21.22 19.16 16.84 8.91 18.54 9.09 5.26
NOTES:
- For each commodity we fit two linear trends. One for the period (1956-68) - and the other 
for the period (1969-80). Trends are obtained by regressing actual values of each commodity 
on time.
SOURCES: UN - Year Book of International Trade Statistics - (1956-1968).
Bank of Sudan Annual Report - (1969-1980).
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APPENDIX 5.B
EXPORT VALUES AFTER THE SUBSTITUTION OF TREND VALUES (FOR ACTUAL VALUES) 
FOR SUDAN 1956-1980
Year Cotton Ground
Nuts
Sesame Gum
Arabic
Cakes 6 
Meals
Dura Live-
Stock
Hides & 
Skins
1956 54.16 65.46 65.60 64.65 64.93 66.23 65.16 65.16
1957 57.35 48.37 48.54 49.11 48.85 48.93 48.19 48.74
1958 49.84 40.85 40.61 39.76 39.99 40.78 39.56 39.88
1959 56.59 64.71 64.14 63.86 63.43 63.13 63.82 63.46
1960 61.68 61.39 59.85 59.43 61.26 59.20 60.65 60.72
1961 63.02 59.14 59.06 58.96 59.51 58.59 59.10 59.22
1962 67.06 73.63 73.46 76.29 74.70 74.50 75.29 74.70
1963 68.49 76.75 77.18 77.99 76.70 76.98 77.64 76.99
1964 72.60 64.25 65.91 67.14 66.40 67.00 67.92 67.34
1965 74.70 65.17 68.02 66.71 66.97 66.17 66.77 67.18
1966 74.64 69.46 70.12 69.97 69.37 69.40 69.64 69.53
1967 73.80 74.79 74.26 73.36 74.43 75.55 73.68 74.03
1968 73.82 83.77 81.71 80.89 81.20 81.29 80.43 80.80
1969 83.26 90.14 84.38 83.54 84.87 80.29 83.20 85.91
1970 94.76 109.89 105.31 102.34 102.28 100.78 102.33 104.59
1971 106.39 117.50 115.40 114.80 114.34 112.32 113.93 115.10
1972 120.86 129.08 125.33 124.66 124.88 123.90 124.57 123.99
1973 152.09 153.59 152.74 155.09 149.69 152.62 152.18 149.34
1974 162.93 119.24 117.90 147.53 125.69 123.15 121.60 121.76
1975 173.87 134.45 154.06 157.10 153.71 157.95 156.35 153.10
1976 194.21 171.36 190.37 194.89 194.84 199.71 198.17 193.40
1977 205.04 219.69 227.70 230.72 229.77 237.45 232.43 230.21
1978 211.24 200.90 200.07 202.53 203.54 213.89 201.76 203.12
1979 202.65 242.96 244.42 229.93 233.81 235.52 243.02 233.96
1980 284.55 286.64 265.63 269.85 267.02 246.86 263.89 269.96
NOTES:
- The figures under each commodity are the value of exports minus the actual value of the commodity 
in question plus the trend value of that commodity.
SOURCES: UN - Year Book of International Trade Statistics -(1956-^1958).
Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (1969-80).
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